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INTRODUCTION 
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit1 (“CAFC”) held in 
1995 that “the interpretation and construction of patent claims, 
which define the scope of the patentee’s rights under the patent, is a 
matter of law exclusively for the court.”2  This definitive statement 
from Markman v. Westview Instruments (“Markman I”) affects nearly all 
patent infringement litigation in the United States, because claim 
construction must occur before an infringement or validity analysis 
can be performed.3  Claim construction involves “determining the 
meaning and scope of the patent claims.”4  In Markman I, a majority 
of the CAFC held that “[b]ecause claim construction is a matter of 
law, the construction given the claims is reviewed de novo on appeal.”5  
An important result of Markman I has been the emergence of the 
“Markman Hearing”6 where the court construes the claims at issue in 
a hearing separate from the rest of the litigation to determine their 
meaning.7 
 
 1 Congress established the CAFC in the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (creating the only federal appellate court based 
on jurisdiction rather than geography).  The CAFC is responsible for appellate 
review of patent cases decided by the federal district courts.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a); 
see also CHISUM ON PATENTS, § 11.06[3][a]. 
 2 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 970-71 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
(en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) [hereinafter Markman I]. 
 3 See id. at 976 (regarding claim construction prior to an examination of 
infringement); Smiths Indus. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Vital Signs, Inc., 183 F.3d 1347, 1353 
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (regarding claim construction before determining claim validity). 
 4 Markman I, 52 F.3d. at 976. 
 5 Id. at 979 (Majority opinion by Archer, C.J.); see also Cybor Corp. v. FAS 
Technologies, Inc., 138 F. 3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Smiths, 183 F.3d at 1353. 
 6 The Markman Hearing may be viewed as a useful tool to determine the correct 
claim construction.  However, it may add additional time and cost to the litigation.  
Patent litigation has been cited as costing each side at least one million dollars.  See 
John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 
26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 187 (1998). 
 7 While typically performed by the trial court judge, the judge may appoint a 
magistrate or special master.  See Robert C. Weiss et al., Markman Practice, Procedure 
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The United States Supreme Court affirmed the CAFC’s holding 
in Markman II.8  Justice Souter stated that claim construction is 
“exclusively within the province of the court.”9  A decisive factor in 
this determination was the special training of judges.  This special 
training would make it more likely that the trial judge, and not the 
jury, would properly construe the claims.10  The critical policy 
rationale behind the Court’s affirmance was the fear of uncertainty in 
patent litigation should juries perform claim construction.11 
A key issue coming out of Markman I & II is whether the 
“training and discipline” of federal district court judges allows them 
to properly construe patent claims.12  As Judge Rader once pointed 
out, the CAFC reversed nearly forty percent of lower court claim 
construction decisions between the time of Markman I and November 
24, 1997.13  Judge Rader maintained that “this reversal rate, hovering 
near fifty percent, is the worst possible.  Even a rate that was much 
higher would provide greater certainty.”14 
In the years since Judge Rader’s comments, reversal rates on 
claim construction have not improved.15  This Comment proposes 
that an understanding of claim format, which undoubtedly presents 
 
and Tactics, in PATENT LITIGATION 2000, at 117, 134 n.13 (PLI Intellectual Prop. 
Course Handbook Series No. G-619, 2000); see also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 
(THIRD) § 20.14 (1995).  The judge may choose not to hold a separate hearing to 
construe the claims, but instead merely issue a claim construction ruling. 
 8 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996) [hereinafter 
Markman II]. 
 9 Id. at 372. 
 10 Id. at 388-89. 
 11 Id. at 391 (“Uniformity would, however, be ill served by submitting issues of 
document construction to juries.”). 
 12 Judge Mayer, in a concurrence to Markman I, aptly noted that “there is simply 
no reason to believe that judges are any more qualified than juries to resolve the 
complex technical issues often present in patent cases.”  Markman v. Westview 
Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 993 (Fed Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 
(1996) (Mayer, J., concurring). 
 13 Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F. 3d 1448, 1476 n.16 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) (Rader, J., dissenting). 
 14 Id. at 1476 (Rader, J., dissenting).  Reversal rates significantly higher (e.g., 
90%) would give litigants the “certainty” that the claim construction will be reversed 
by the CAFC. 
 15 See Gretchen Ann Bender, Uncertainty And Unpredictability In Patent Litigation: 
The Time Is Ripe For A Consistent Claim Construction Methodology, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 
175, 203-07 (2001) (noting that from the time of Markman I through 2000, the CAFC 
reversed or modified 65 out of 160 district court claim construction decisions, 
approximately 40%).  In 2001, the CAFC reversed 41.5% of lower court claim 
constructions.  See infra at Part III.C. for a complete analysis of the CAFC cases 
decided in 2001. 
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one of the most bizarre sentence structures in the English language,16 
is fundamental to performing a correct claim construction analysis.  
In addition to understanding claim format, trial judges need clear 
guidance from the CAFC.  For example, the trial courts, in 
attempting to live up to the strictures of Markman I, perform 
Markman Hearings at every stage of litigation.17  There are no 
controlling standards for when (or if) to hold a Markman Hearing.18  
Indeed, the lack of guidance from the CAFC may leave trial judges 
uncertain as to how best to conduct claim construction hearings.19  
The CAFC should be clear about when (and how) to hold Markman 
Hearings.  The CAFC should indicate which substantive resources20 
can help the judge perform claim construction.  Furthermore, the 
CAFC should articulate when and how to apply canons of claim 
construction.21 
This Comment will analyze trial courts’ claim construction in 
light of subsequent CAFC review of those decisions.22  One goal is to 
determine whether the use of Markman Hearings increases the 
likelihood of affirmance.  Another goal is to uncover what mistakes 
trial courts continue to make in spite of a vast body of CAFC decisions 
to guide them.  Part I presents background information regarding 
patents generally and Markman I and its progeny.  Part II discusses 
the Markman Hearing and related claim construction resources.  Part 
III reviews all of the CAFC’s claim construction decisions from 2001 
to find what key mistakes trial judges continue to make when 
construing patent claims.  Part III concludes with a summary of the 
 
 16 See The Honorable S. Jay Plager, Symposium: Intellectual Property Challenges in the 
Next Century: Article Challenges for Intellectual Property Law in the Twenty-First Century: 
Indeterminacy and Other Problems, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 69, 71 (2001) (“The writing of 
English this is not . . . reading claims is an art of sorts, involving half technology and 
half linguistics.  To many trial judges it is a foreign art; understandably, they are not 
batting 1.000 (more like .500)”). 
 17 See infra notes 142-146 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 140-141 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 139-146 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra Part II.B.2. 
 21 See infra Part II.B.3. 
 22 For purposes of this article, the author conducted a detailed study of all CAFC 
cases decided in 2001 where claim construction was an issue (i.e., where the CAFC 
issued a decision that included affirming or reversing a lower court’s claim 
construction).  The study analyzed ninety-four cases.  The study examined whether 
Markman Hearings were held, whether the trial court granted summary judgment, 
whether the CAFC reversed summary judgment on appeal, and whether the CAFC 
reversed the claim construction on appeal.  The analysis also looked at reasons why 
the CAFC reversed claim construction decisions, in the hope that such information 
will provide direction for trial courts to improve their claim constructions in the 
future.  See infra note 271 for more details about this study. 
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findings and a proposal to improve trial court claim construction 
efficacy. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The Patent Grant 
A patent is both a legal and technical document.23  It provides 
the patentee with a limited monopoly24 that allows him to prevent 
others from making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing the 
patented invention into the United States.25  The United States 
Constitution provides Congress the right to “promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”26  Congress delegates this responsibility to the Patent 
and Trademark Office (“PTO”), a branch of the Department of 
Commerce.27  After a patent examiner determines that the claims of a 
patent application are novel,28 useful29 and non-obvious,30 and meet all 
other statutory requirements, the application is approved by the 
Director (formerly Commissioner) of Patents and Trademarks.31  The 
 
 23 Markman I articulated the legal aspect of the patent: “The patent is a fully 
integrated written instrument . . . [and is] a government grant of rights to the 
patentee.”  Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
(en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (referring to 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1994)).  The 
technical aspect of the patent: 
shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner 
and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise and 
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it 
pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use 
the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the 
inventor of carrying out his invention. 
35 U.S.C. § 112 (first paragraph) (1994). 
 24 Utility patents (and plant patents) based on applications filed on or after June 
8, 1995 are in force for twenty years from date of filing.  35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2); see also 
MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2700 (“MPEP”) (U.S. Department of 
Commerce, United States Patent and Trademark Office, 8th ed. 2001).  Design 
patents are valid for fourteen years from date of issue.  35 U.S.C. § 173 (1994).  The 
CAFC cases from 2001, and hence the scope of this Comment, only involve utility 
patents. 
 25 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a)(1), 271(a) (1994). 
 26 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 27 35 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). 
 28 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994) (stating that a person “shall be entitled to a patent 
unless” the invention is precluded by any one (or more) of six types of events). 
 29 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (identifying the types of inventions that are patentable 
if new and useful). 
 30 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994) (denying patentability where prior art is not identical to 
the claims of the application but the differences between them are too small). 
 31 The official title of the person in charge of the USPTO is “Under Secretary of 
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PTO then issues the patent grant.32  The grant allows the patentee to 
enforce the patent claims, because only the claims constitute the 
metes and bounds of the limited monopoly.33 
Nearly anyone can apply for a patent.34  An applicant may 
prepare the application pro se, or can enlist the aid of a patent agent 
or attorney.35  Regardless of who prepares a non-provisional 
application,36 it must contain a specification,37 at least one claim,38 a 
drawing (if necessary)39 and the applicant’s oath40 (or declaration) 
 
Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office.”  35 U.S.C. § 3(a)(1) (1994).  Unlike the first Commissioner, 
Thomas Jefferson (see Amy Harmon, In the ‘Idea Wars,’ a Fight to Control a New 
Currency, N. Y. TIMES, November 11, 2001, at BU 7), Directors of the USPTO no 
longer examine patent applications themselves.  35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1994).  There is a 
patent examination corps numbering several thousand, which has this duty 
(according to the PTO Information Directory (August 2000)); see also the on-line 
USPTO employee locator at http://pair.uspto.gov/cgi-bin/final/employee_ 
loc.pl?action=querypg (last visited March 24, 2002).  Two current members of the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Judge Gajarsa and Judge Linn, were patent 
examiners at one time.  See U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Judicial 
Biographies, Judges of the Federal Circuit, at http://www.fedcir.gov/judgbios.html 
(last revised Mar. 5, 2002). 
 32 35 U.S.C. § 2 (1994) (“The Patent and Trademark Office shall have a seal 
which letters patent, certificates of trade-mark registrations, and papers issued from 
the office shall be authenticated”). 
 33 35 U.S.C. § 112 (second paragraph) (1994); MPEP 2106(C) (“The claims 
define the property rights provided by a patent, and thus require careful scrutiny”). 
 34 35 U.S.C. § 4 (1994) (excluding officers and employees of the PTO from 
applying for a patent during the course of employment and one year after 
employment). 
 35 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(D) (1994) (giving the PTO the power to establish 
regulations governing “the recognition and conduct of agents, attorneys, or other 
persons representing applicants”); See also 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.33-34; 10.5-10 (2000).  An 
agent is a person not an attorney but who has a science or technical background 
meeting the requirements promulgated by the PTO.  See 37 C.F.R. § 10.6(b) and 
GENERAL REQUIREMENTS BULLETIN FOR ADMISSION TO THE EXAMINATION FOR 
REGISTRATION TO PRACTICE IN PATENT CASES BEFORE THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND 
TRADEMARK OFFICE (for the April 17, 2002 exam), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/oed/index.html (last modified May 
22, 2002).  The author of this Comment is a registered patent agent.  The views 
expressed herein are the views of the author, and not necessarily those of his 
employers or their clients. 
 36 37 C.F.R. § 1.53(b) (2000) provides for a non-provisional application (“NPA”).  
The NPA is a complete application, including claims.  Section 1.53(c) permits an 
applicant to file a provisional patent application (“PPA”).  The PPA need not present 
claims.  The PPA is not examined by the PTO.  It merely acts as a placeholder, giving 
the applicant one year to further develop or market the invention, at which time an 
NPA can be filed claiming the benefit of the filing date of the PPA without fear of 
breaking a statutory bar.  See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994). 
 37 35 U.S.C. §§ 111(a)(2)(A); 112 (1994). 
 38 35 U.S.C. § 112 (second paragraph). 
 39 35 U.S.C. §§ 111(a)(2)(B); 113 (1994). 
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stating “he believes himself to be the original and first inventor of the 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or 
improvement thereof, for which he solicits a patent.”41 
The specification provides a detailed presentation and 
explanation of the invention.42  “The specification shall conclude with 
one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming 
the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.”43  
The purpose of the specification is to “enable any person skilled in 
the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, 
to make and use the same.”44  The person skilled in the art necessarily 
has some expertise and familiarity with the technology of the 
invention.  Thus, the patent may be enabling and valid,45 but may not 
provide enough information to make the technology understandable 
to a judge or a jury.  As will be explained below, a correct claim 
construction requires the judge to perform the analysis from the 
point of view of a “person skilled in the art.” 
B.  Patent Prosecution 
After it is filed, a patent examiner46 reviews the application to 
ensure it meets the statutory requirements.47  Notably, the examiner 
performs his or her own claim construction.48  The examiner 
prepares an Office Action pointing out deficiencies in the application 
 
 40 35 U.S.C. § 111(a)(2)(C) (1994). 
 41 Id. § 115. 
 42 “The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of 
the manner and process of making and using it.”  Id. § 112 (first paragraph); 37 
C.F.R. § 1.71 (2000).  The patent application also includes a title and an abstract.  37 
C.F.R. § 1.72 (2000).  The PTO cannot use the abstract when interpreting the scope 
of a claim.  37 C.F.R. § 1.72(b).  However, the courts are not bound by this 
requirement.  See Hill-Rom Co., Inc. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 209 F.3d 1337, 1341 
n.* (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.77 (2000) for a listing of application 
elements. 
 43 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 2 (1994). 
 44 Id. at para. 1. 
 45 Id. § 282 (1994) (“A patent shall be presumed valid. . . .  The burden of 
establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting 
such invalidity.”). 
 46 Patent examiners are quasi-legal officials.  See Markman v. Westview 
Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 986 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 
(1996). 
 47 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.104 (2000) (Nature of examination). 
 48 MPEP 2106(C) (“Office personnel must first determine the scope of a claim by 
thoroughly analyzing the language of the claim before determining if the claim 
complies with each statutory requirement for patentability.”).  An overview of patent 
examiner claim construction is discussed infra Part II.B.2, which further explains 
MPEP §§ 2106(C) and 2111. 
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and often rejects most (if not all) of the claims.49  The applicant (or 
his attorney or agent) has the opportunity to file an amendment 
responding to the Office Action.50  The amendment must “distinctly 
and specifically point[] out the supposed errors in the examiner’s 
action and must reply to every ground of objection and rejection in 
the prior Office [A]ction.”51  Amendments often include changes to 
the claims so as to distinguish them from the prior art.52  This give 
and take between the examiner and the applicant continues until the 
examiner allows the claims or the applicant abandons the 
application.53  The amendments and Office Actions form a critical 
part of the prosecution history54 of the application, because they 
often explain or limit the scope of the claims. 
C.  Patent Litigation 
Patent litigation is a federal matter, taking place almost 
exclusively in the district courts.55  Plaintiffs can elect either a jury 
 
 49 The author conducted an informal survey of twenty-five patent attorneys and 
agents, asking them what percentage of claims are typically rejected in a first office 
action.  The survey provided four percentage ranges: 0-25%, 25-50%, 50-75%, and 
75-100%.  The practitioners unanimously responded with 75-100%.  Survey results 
are on file with the author. 
 50 37 C.F.R. § 1.111. 
 51 Id. § 1.111(b). 
 52 The term “prior art” is actually a term of art unto itself.  It includes items such 
as patents and publications available that predate the effective date of the instant 
patent application (the effective date is typically the date filed at the PTO).  See, e.g., 
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).  Note that changes made to claim elements during 
prosecution that narrow the scope of the claim may give rise to prosecution history 
estoppel.  See Festo Corp. v. Shokatsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 187 F.3d 1381 
(Fed. Cir. 1999), vacated and remanded, 535 U.S. 722 (2002). 
 53 The applicant has the option of continuing prosecution by filing continuing 
applications under 37 C.F.R. section 1.53(b) or (d), or by filing a request for 
continuing examination under 37 C.F.R. section 1.114 (2000).  A final rejection may 
be appealed to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences.  See 35 U.S.C. § 134 
(1994); 37 C.F.R. § 1.191 (2000).  See generally MPEP ch. 1200. 
 54 The written record of a patent application was formerly known as the “file 
wrapper,” see Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GMBH v. Dana Corp., 133 
F. Supp. 2d 833, 837 (E.D. Va. 2001), and is now usually referred to as the 
“prosecution history.”  See Karen Millane Whitney, Sources of Patent Prosecution History 
Must Not Violate Public Notice Requirement, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 266, 268 n.6 (2001) 
(“Prosecution history is synonymous with the file wrapper of the patent.”). 
 55 See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1994).  “The district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, 
plant variety protection, copyrights, and trademarks.  Such jurisdiction shall be 
exclusive of the courts of the states in patent, plant variety protection and copyright 
cases.”  Id.  Note that while district courts have patent case jurisdiction to the 
exclusion of state courts, the PTO’s Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, the 
Court of Federal Claims and the International Trade Commission may all hear 
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trial or a bench trial.56  Unlike patent attorneys and agents, there is 
no requirement that judges have any specific expertise with regard to 
patent-related matters.57  Thus, the judge may not have any practical 
experience regarding claims or patent prosecution.  However, the 
judge should have some understanding of patents generally and the 
patent at issue, in order to effectively handle the litigation.58 
Three CAFC decisions discuss some general guidelines for claim 
construction.  Markman I provides a foundation for district court 
claim construction.  Vitronics v. Conceptronics59 explains how to deal 
with different types of patent-related evidence.  Cybor v. FAS 
Technologies explains why the CAFC performs de novo review of claim 
construction.60  These cases will be examined in turn. 
 
patent cases under their respective jurisdictional scopes.  28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1994); 19 
U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1) (1994). 
 56 FED. R. CIV. P. 38; see also Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases – an 
Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 367-68 (2000) (extensively 
analyzing 1411 patent cases that went to trial over a seventeen year period, from 1983 
through 1999 to determine whether there was any disparity between decisions 
rendered by judges as opposed to juries). 
 57 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(D) (1994) permits the Commissioner to recognize and 
regulate patent attorneys and agents.  See also 37 C.F.R. §§ 10.5-10.6 (2000).  Prior to 
becoming a patent attorney or agent, the individual must pass a rigorous 
examination known as the “Patent Bar.”  See 37 C.F.R. § 10.7(b) (2000).  The 
examination tests “an applicant’s knowledge of patent law and United States Patent 
and Trademark Office rules, practice and procedure; understanding of claim 
drafting and ability to properly draft claims.”  GENERAL REQUIREMENTS BULLETIN FOR 
ADMISSION TO THE EXAMINATION FOR REGISTRATION TO PRACTICE IN PATENT CASES 
BEFORE THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE 6 (for the April 17, 2002 
exam), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/oed/index.html 
(last modified May 22, 2002).  The Patent Bar is believed to be the only specialty 
exam an attorney must pass to practice in a particular area of law.  See also Mark L. 
Austrian & Shaun Mohler, Timing is Everything in Patent Litigation – Fulfilling the 
Promise of Markman, 9 FED. CIR. B.J. 227, 229 (1999) (noting that trial judges 
generally have no patent experience); see also Moore, supra note 56, at 374 (“Most 
judges have no special knowledge, education or training in the technology that is at 
issue in a patent case.”). 
 58 Under the adversarial system the litigants should educate the judge because it 
is not the judge’s role to perform her own fact-finding.  However, without a proper 
foundation, claim construction (like other specialized areas of law) is very difficult to 
perform correctly, as the 40% reversal rate cited by Judge Rader illustrates.  See supra 
text accompanying note 13.  It is also important to note that patent litigation 
attorneys, unless practicing before the USPTO in an appeal or interference, are not 
required to be licensed to practice patent law before the PTO.  See 37 C.F.R. §§ 10.5 
(individuals recognized to represent applicants before the USPTO “in the 
preparation and prosecution of applications”), 10.7 (dealing with registration to 
practice before the USPTO). 
 59 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 60 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
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1.  Markman I: Claim Construction as Determined by the 
CAFC 
In Markman I, plaintiff Herbert Markman held a patent for an 
“Inventory Control and Reporting System for Drycleaning Stores.”61  
Markman sued Westview Instruments and Althon Enterprises for 
allegedly infringing claims 1, 10, and 14 of the patent.62 
The focal point of the litigation became the meaning of the 
term “inventory” as used in the claims.  The trial court “charged the 
jury on infringement, instructing it to ‘determine the meaning of the 
claims . . . using the relevant patent documents including the 
specifications, the drawings and the file histories.’”63  The jury 
determined that the defendants infringed claims 1 and 10, but not 
14.64  The judge then construed the meaning of the claims.65  The 
judge ruled that the term “‘inventory’ meant ‘articles of clothing’ and 
not simply transaction totals or dollars.”66  Under such an 
interpretation, the court held that defendants did not infringe the 
claims at issue, and granted defendants’ motion for judgment as a 
matter of law.67 
Markman appealed the district court decision.68  The CAFC 
began its claim construction analysis by noting that it (the CAFC) had 
not consistently held that claim construction is a matter of law.69  In 
order to resolve the inconsistency, the CAFC stated that the Supreme 
Court had “repeatedly held that the construction of a patent claim is 
a matter of law exclusively for the court.”70  Furthermore, the CAFC 
stated that written documents are exclusively construed by the court.71 
Next, the CAFC analyzed the types of evidence available to aid a 
judge in construing the claims.  The three intrinsic sources of 
evidence are “the claims, the specification, and the prosecution 
history.”72  All other evidence is extrinsic, including dictionaries,73 
 
 61 52 F.3d at 971.  (The patent was a reissue patent, No. 33,054.  Positek, a 
licensee of the patent, was also a plaintiff in the litigation.). 
 62 Id. at 972. 
 63 Id. at 973. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 973 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en 
banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 970. 
 69 Id. at 976-77. 
 70 Id. at 977. 
 71 Markman I, 52 F.3d at 978. 
 72 Id. at 979.  The prosecution history includes all documents filed in conjunction 
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treatises, sales literature, and inventor and expert testimony.74 
Not all evidence is created equal.  The sole purpose of examining 
evidence besides the claims themselves is to help the judge interpret 
the claims.  The written description of the specification and the 
prosecution history “can and should be used to understand the 
language used in the claims.”75  Use of extrinsic evidence is even more 
limited.  It “is to be used for the court’s understanding of the patent, 
not for the purpose of varying or contradicting the terms of the 
claims.”76  Thus, a judge should use extrinsic evidence to educate 
herself on the technology pertaining to the patent such that she can 
correctly apply intrinsic evidence in claim construction.77 
In Markman I, the CAFC noted that the intrinsic evidence 
supported the district court’s claim construction, finding that “the 
language of the claim itself suggests the conclusion that the dry-
cleaner’s ‘inventory’ includes clothing.  The patent specification 
confirms this . . .  [T]he prosecution history is also in accord.”78  The 
CAFC discounted testimony and sales literature pointing at 
alternative constructions, giving it no deference.79  Although they 
might have “in fact used ‘inventory’ to mean other than articles of 
clothing, Westview’s sales literature and the testimony of its president 
do not dissuade us from our legal construction of the claim, based on 
the patent and prosecution history.”80 
After examining the various types of evidence available, the 
court went on to weigh how best to analyze the claims.  The court 
compared patents to contracts and statutes, finding that they are 
more closely equated with the latter.81  A contract is a private 
agreement between two parties,82 whereas the patent is a limited 
 
with the patent.  For example, applicants may file an invention disclosure statement 
(“IDS”) containing listings of relevant material.  See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.56 (2000) (“Duty 
to disclose information material to patentability”), 1.97 (2000) (“Filing of 
information disclosure statement”), and 1.98 (2000) (“Content of information 
disclosure statement”). 
 73 Dictionaries are really a hybrid of intrinsic and extrinsic evidence.  See infra 
Part III.D for a discussion on this somewhat problematic form of evidence. 
 74 Markman I, 52 F.3d at 980. 
 75 Id.  The abstract may also be used by the court to determine the scope of the 
invention.  See supra note 42. 
 76 Markman I, 52 F.3d at 981. 
 77 Id. (stating that the court should look “to the extrinsic evidence to assist in its 
construction of the written document”). 
 78 Id. at 982. 
 79 Id. at 983. 
 80 Markman I, 52 F.3d at 983. 
 81 Id. at 987. 
 82 Id. 
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monopoly obtained from the federal government.83  The parol 
evidence rule may act to exclude certain information and 
documentation when analyzing a contract.84  In contrast, patent 
examiners evaluate patent applications in ex parte proceedings.85  The 
parol evidence rule does not apply to patents.86 
On the other hand, the court stated that “statutes are written 
instruments that all persons are presumed to be aware of and are 
bound to follow.  Statutes, like patents, are enforceable against the 
public, unlike private agreements between contracting parties.”87  The 
judge tasked with interpreting a statute “looks to the language of the 
statute and construes it according to the traditional tools of statutory 
construction.”88  The judge may review the legislative history of a 
statute if necessary.89  Legislative history is much like a patent’s 
prosecution history, because both are available to the public.90  The 
final factor tipping the scales in favor of a statute-like analysis by the 
court was intent.  As with statutes, the “subjective meaning that a 
patentee may ascribe to claim language is also not determinative.  
Thus, it is from the public record that a court should seek in a patent 
infringement case to find the meaning of claim language.”91  
Therefore, the CAFC concluded that judges must perform claim 
construction.92 
2.  Vitronics: Evidence Used In Claim Construction 
More than a year after deciding Markman I—and only a few 
months after the Supreme Court affirmed Markman I93—the CAFC 
expanded upon its discussion of patent evidence in Vitronics v. 
 
 83 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
 84 U.C.C. § 2-202 (1998) (providing that “a final expression of [the agreement] 
with respect to such terms as are included therein may not be contradicted by 
evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may 
be explained or supplemented”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213 
(1978). 
 85 Markman I, 52 F.3d at 985. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. at 987. 
 88 Id.  The CAFC also briefly mentioned cannons of construction regarding 
statutes.  Id.  Cannons of construction also exist in patent law, and will be discussed 
infra Part II.B.2. 
 89 Markman I, 52 F.3d at 987. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at 970-71. 
 93 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
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Conceptronics.94  Vitronics dealt with a patent for a method of reflowing 
solder during the manufacture of printed circuit boards (“PCBs”).95  
Both plaintiff and defendant manufactured ovens used to make the 
PCBs.96 
Typically, a circuit board is designed and fabricated with contact 
areas (e.g., pads) to receive surface mounted devices such as resistors, 
capacitors, integrated circuits and other electronic components.97  A 
solder paste is applied before the surface mounted devices are placed 
on the pads.98  After the devices are put on the circuit board, the 
board goes through an oven.99  The heat from the oven melts the 
solder paste.100  Once the circuit board cools, the surface mounted 
devices are securely attached to the board via the solder.101 
The only issue in the case dealt with a term in claim 1, regarding 
a “method for reflow soldering.”102  The question was what did the 
term “solder reflow temperature” mean.103  The trial court held that 
the term meant specifically a liquidus temperature of 183ºC, as 
defendant Conceptronics maintained.104  In construing the term, the 
trial court relied not only on intrinsic evidence, but also on “expert 
testimony, prior testimony and writings of Vitronics and its 
employees, and technical references.”105 
In reversing the judgment as a matter of law against the plaintiff, 
the CAFC analyzed the extrinsic evidence relied on by the trial 
court.106  The Court stated that the testimony and documents 
presented by the defendant supported its contention that solder 
reflow occurred at the liquidus temperature of 183ºC.107  However, a 
 
 94 Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronics, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 95 Id. at 1579. 
 96 Id. at 1578-79. 
 97 Id. at 1579; see also VERN SOLBERG, DESIGN GUIDELINES FOR SURFACE MOUNT 
TECHNOLOGY 10, 34-49 (1990). 
 98 90 F.3d at 1579. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Vitronics, 90 F.3d 1579. 
 103 Id. at 1579-80.  At trial, the judge performed claim construction of the term at 
the end of testimony.  Id. at 1580. 
 104 Id. at 1580. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. at 1581, 1585.  The CAFC noted that while the trial court did not specify 
which evidence it used in rendering its claim construction, it “must have relied on 
the testimony presented by Conceptronic that ‘solder reflow temperature’ and 
‘liquidus temperature’ were synonymous.”  Id. at 1585 n.7. 
 107 Id. at 1581. 
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review of the intrinsic evidence clearly showed that solder reflow 
temperature meant “peak reflow temperature.”108 
The CAFC found the intrinsic evidence dispositive and was clear 
to point out that intrinsic evidence will be sufficient in most cases.109  
Only after a review of the intrinsic evidence, if “some genuine 
ambiguity [exists] in the claims,” should the court look at extrinsic 
evidence.110  Extrinsic evidence should be used to educate the judge 
so that she can sufficiently interpret the intrinsic evidence.111  
However, not all extrinsic evidence is created equal. 
The CAFC lumped all forms of testimony regarding claim 
construction together.  Whether from “an attorney, a technical 
expert, or the inventor,”112 it is equally suspect.  Such “expert 
testimony . . . often only indicates what a particular expert believes a 
term means.”113  Furthermore, “opinion testimony on claim 
construction should be treated with the utmost caution for it is no 
better than opinion testimony on the meaning of statutory terms.”114 
Documents predating the patent, including other patents, 
technical literature, treatises and dictionaries are “to a lesser extent . . 
. more objective and reliable guides” than testimony.115  That is 
because these documents “are accessible to the public in advance of 
litigation.”116  As will be seen later, the CAFC has a special fondness 
for dictionaries.117  Contrary to its caution against using extrinsic 
information, the CAFC in Vitronics pointed out that dictionaries and 
treatises: 
are worthy of special note.  Judges are free to consult such 
resources at any time in order to better understand the 
underlying technology and may also rely on dictionary definitions 
when construing claim terms, so long as the dictionary definition 
does not contradict any definition found in or ascertained by a 
 
 108 Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583.  The peak reflow temperature was between 210ºC 
and 218ºC.  Id. 
 109 “In most situations, an analysis of the intrinsic evidence alone will resolve any 
ambiguity in a disputed claim term.  In such circumstances, it is improper to rely on 
extrinsic evidence.”  Id. at 1583.  Almost as an aside, near the very end of the decision 
the court stated that situations where extrinsic evidence is needed “will rarely, if ever, 
occur.”  Id. at 1585. 
 110 Id. at 1584. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Vitronics, 90 F.3d 1585. 
 113 Id. at 1584. 
 114 Id. at 1585. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 See infra Part III.D. 
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reading of the patent documents.118 
To sum up, dictionaries and treatises may be employed at any 
time unless the intrinsic evidence explicitly defines a claim element 
in a specific way.  The trial court may admit other extrinsic evidence 
at its discretion.119  Prior art references may be used when the 
intrinsic evidence is unclear.  A court should attempt to use prior art 
before admitting testimony, because “prior art references may . . . be 
more indicative of what all those skilled in the art generally believe a 
certain term means.”120  When all else fails, the court may consider 
testimony to help clear up any remaining confusion.  And the judge 
must remember that the extrinsic evidence is merely a tool to help 
him or her construe the claims in light of the intrinsic evidence.  
Extrinsic evidence must not be employed to contradict what the 
intrinsic evidence teaches. 
3.  Cybor v. FAS: the Standard of Review 
The Supreme Court held in Markman II that claim construction 
was a matter of law for the courts to decide.121  The Supreme Court 
acknowledged that claim construction involved both law and facts, 
but made a pragmatic decision to place this “mongrel practice” in the 
hands of the judiciary.122  Less than two years later, in Cybor v. FAS 
Technologies, the CAFC applied a generous logic to Markman II and 
declared en banc that it had the authority to review claim construction 
decisions de novo.123  The decision in Cybor was aimed at reaffirming 
the CAFC’s earlier enunciation of the de novo standard, while 
pointing out that some of its cases post-Markman I had applied a 
clearly erroneous standard.124 
The Cybor majority criticized the idea that facts played a role in 
claim construction.  “[W]e therefore reaffirm that, as a purely legal 
question, we review claim construction [de novo] on appeal including 
 
 118 Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584 n.6. 
 119 Id. at 1584.  In contrast, the parol evidence rule prevents the admission of 
certain evidence with respect to contractual agreements.  U.C.C. § 2-202; see also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213 (1978). 
 120 Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584. 
 121 See supra text accompanying note 9. 
 122 517 U.S. 370, 388-89. 
 123 138 F.3d 1448, 1451.  “[W]e conclude that the Supreme Court’s unanimous 
affirmance in Markman v. Westview Industries, Inc., of our [en banc] judgment in 
that case fully supports our conclusion that claim construction, as a purely legal issue, 
is subject to [de novo] review on appeal.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 124 Id. at 1454. 
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any allegedly fact-based questions relating to claim construction.”125  
By totally ignoring the findings of the trial court in its claim 
construction, arguably the CAFC will reverse a higher percentage of 
cases than had it chosen a more deferential standard of review.126 
The concurring and dissenting opinions in Cybor present insights 
into the turmoil within the CAFC regarding appellate claim 
construction.  Judge Plager stated that the CAFC should not wholly 
disregard the analysis of the trial court when performing its own 
claim construction.  “Common sense dictates that the trial judge’s 
view will carry weight.”127  The judge acknowledged that the important 
question to keep in mind is “what do the claims mean?”128  Judge 
Bryson was also of the mind to rely on the trial court’s legwork.  
Merely because “claim construction is an issue of law does not mean 
that we intend to disregard the work done by district courts in claim 
construction or that we will give no weight to a district court’s 
conclusion as to claim construction.”129 
Judge Mayer, while concurring, was even more outspoken 
against the non-deferential standard enunciated by the majority.  The 
judge first noted that the Supreme Court’s decision in Markman II to 
place the burden of claim construction on the judge instead of the 
jury “was a perilous decision of last resort.”130  Next, the judge 
correctly pointed out that the Supreme Court could have, but did 
not, “accept our formulation of claim construction[] as a pure 
question of law to be decided [de novo] in all cases on appeal.”131  
Judge Mayer stated that a pure de novo standard of review “would 
transform [the CAFC] into a trial court of first and usually last 
 
 125 Id. at 1456.  The CAFC also noted that certain comments by the Supreme 
Court in Markman II “do not support the view that . . . while construction is a legal 
question for the judge, there may also be underlying fact questions.”  Id. 
 126 See Moore, supra note 56, at 396-97 (“[D]eferential standards of review should 
result in a greater number of overall affirmances (lower reversal rates) by the CAFC 
than in cases resolved on dispositive motions (such as summary judgment), where 
the standard of review would be de novo.”).  On the other hand, one could argue that 
even if the standard of review were more deferential to trial courts, the CAFC would 
still overturn claim constructions at the same rate because the Court could find that 
any claim construction error was “clear error.” 
 127 138 F.3d at 1462 (Plager, J., concurring). 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. at 1463 (Bryson, J., concurring). 
 130 Id. at 1464 (Mayer, J., concurring). 
 131 Id.  The judge also averred that because the Supreme Court chose judges to 
determine the meaning of claims rather than juries, the standard of review should 
reflect some deference.  “[W]hen the judge finds facts or accepts the factual 
determination of a jury, those facts are entitled to greater deference than [de novo] 
fact findings on appeal.”  Id. 
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resort.”132  Notably, Judge Mayer commented that the CAFC was 
sending a terrible message to trial courts, subliminally 
recommending them to not clearly articulate their claim construction 
because they stood a better chance of being affirmed on appeal.133 
The most blistering criticism of the majority opinion came in a 
dissent by Judge Rader.  The judge commented that blind 
indifference to the work of the trial court would “undermine, if not 
destroy, the values of certainty and predictability sought by [Markman 
I].”134  Judge Rader presented an extensive list of procedural 
problems created by the CAFC’s decision in Markman I.135  
Furthermore, the judge stated that the majority had “sub silentio 
redefined the claim construction inquiry” because the decisions in 
Markman I and Vitronics sought to mitigate the use of expert 
testimony.136 
With the benefit of three years of case law post-Markman I, Judge 
Rader pointed out in a footnote that de novo review resulted in 
“reversal, in whole or in part, of almost 40% of all claim construction 
since Markman I.”137  Four years after Cybor, the question that remains 
is whether those involved in patent litigation: 
have enough experience with “Markman Hearings” and with 
appellate review under the [de novo] regime to draw any 
empirically sound conclusions.  In such circumstances there is 
much to be said for refraining from premature and 
argumentative judgments about what it all means, and for 
allowing sufficient time to actually see how it works.138 
As Part III.C. will demonstrated later, there is sufficient evidence to 
conclude that Markman Hearings do not promote correct claim 
construction. 
 
 132 Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1466 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 133 Id. at 1471. 
 134 Id. at 1474 (Rader, J., dissenting).  Judge Rader also noted that appropriate 
deference to trial judges would “restore the trial court’s prominence in the claim 
interpretation function and bring again more certainty at an earlier stage of the 
judicial process.”  Id. at 1478 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
 135 Id. at 1475, n14 (Rader, J., dissenting).  Judge Rader listed eight “procedural 
deviations.”  Two dealt with claim interpretation, two with multiple trials, and 
another cautioned against a bias in favor of summary judgment.  The summary 
judgment problem will be examined more fully infra Part III.B. 
 136 Id.  “In any event, it seems a contradiction to bar those of skill in the art at the 
time of invention from a search for the meaning of terms to one of skill in the art at 
the time of the invention.”  Id. (Rader, J., dissenting). 
 137 See supra text accompanying note 13. 
 138 138 F.3d at 1476 (Plager, J., concurring). 
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II.  MARKMAN HEARINGS AND CLAIM CONSTRUCTION GENERALLY 
A.  The Markman Hearing: What it is and How it Works 
The Markman Hearing, or claim construction hearing, is a 
hearing in which the parties present evidence bearing on the 
meaning of the patent claims at issue.139  There are no requirements 
as to procedures the judge must follow.140  In fact, the judge need not 
even hold a Markman Hearing before construing the claims.141 
Because there are no rules or guidelines, it is not surprising that 
trial judges perform Markman Hearings at every stage of litigation 
prior to charging the jury.142  The hearing can take place before, 
during or after discovery.143  It can occur at summary judgment or 
right before opening arguments.144  It can also happen during trial, 
either before or after closing arguments.145  It may be a separate 
hearing or may be combined with a summary judgment motion.146 
Each alternative has its own benefits and drawbacks.  Holding 
the hearing at some point before trial promotes efficiencies in both 
cost and time at the expense of fully exploring all the evidence.147  
Hearings performed during the trial may allow the judge to examine 
all the relevant evidence, but with the increased expense of putting 
on a trial.148  Alternatively, efficiency-minded litigants may attempt 
some form of an expedited appeal.149  However, the CAFC rarely (if 
 
 139 ROBERT C. KAHRL, PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION § 12.02 (2001) (“[S]hortly 
after [Markman I], some district courts began to hold separate hearings to hear 
arguments and take testimony concerning disputed meanings of claim terms.”). 
 140 Ballard Med. Products v. Allegiance Healthcare Corp., 268 F.3d 1352, 1358 
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Contrary to Ballard’s contention, Markman [I] does not require a 
district court to follow any particular procedure in conducting claim construction.”). 
 141 Id. at 1358.  “There is nothing unique about claim construction that requires 
the court to proceed according to any particular protocol.  As long as the trial court 
construes the claims to the extent necessary to determine whether the accused device 
infringes, the court may approach the task in any way that it deems best.”  Id. (emphasis 
added).  However, because appellate courts have reversed trial courts at such a high 
rate, one suggestion is for the CAFC to prepare formal guidelines that judges may 
follow should they choose to hold a Markman Hearing. 
 142 See William F. Lee & Anita K. Krug, Still Adjusting to Markman: A Prescription for 
the Timing of Claim Construction Hearings, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 55 (1999).  Lee and 
Krug posit that the timing of the Markman Hearing is “[o]ne of the most intractable 
issues created by Markman [I].”  Id. at 56. 
 143 Id. at 73. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. 
 147 KAHRL, supra note 139, § 12.02[A]. 
 148 See Allison & Lemley, supra note 6. 
 149 See John B. Pegram, Markman and its Implications, 78 J. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF. 
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ever) accepts interlocutory appeals of claim interpretation.150  Since 
there is no consistency among trial courts as to the timing of 
Markman Hearings, the obvious, though unanswered, question is 
whether timing impacts claim construction reversal rates.151 
B.  Patent Litigation Resources Available to Aid the Trial Judge 
Various procedural, legal and substantive resources exist to help 
the trial judge in the claim construction task.  Procedural resources 
include magistrate judges, special masters, court-appointed experts 
and local patent rules that lay out templates for case management.  
Substantive resources include patent-related literature that provides 
claim construction guidance.  Legal resources comprise the cannons 
of claim construction. 
1.  Procedural Resources 
The judge may decide to “farm out” the Markman Hearing to a 
special master under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.152  The 
special master, such as a patent attorney, performs the hearing and 
issues a claim construction report, which the trial judge may choose 
to adopt.153  Alternatively, the trial judge may employ a magistrate 
 
SOC’Y 561, 567 (1996) (discussing various methods including summary judgment, 
certification, preliminary injunction, and a separate judgment under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 54(b)). 
 150 Lee & Krug, supra note 142, at 68 (citing Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, 
Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).  However, litigants have begun to 
stipulate as to claim construction rulings in order to expedite an appeal.  See 
Generation II Orthotics Inc. v. Medical Tech., Inc., 263 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 
2001).  In that case, Generation II sued Medical Technology over a patent for an 
orthopedic knee brace.  Id. at 1362.  The trial court construed the claims in such a 
way that Medical Technology did not infringe.  Id.  Generation II stipulated as to 
entry of a judgment of non-infringement and then appealed to the CAFC.  Id. at 
1363. 
 151 In order to perform such an analysis, one would likely have to examine the 
trial court records for every claim construction decision appealed to the CAFC.  
Unfortunately, the records may not reflect when (or if) hearings were held, the 
evidence presented, or the evidence relied upon by the judge.  Thus, reliable 
statistical information regarding this question will be left for another day. 
 152 FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a) (“The court in which any action is pending may appoint a 
special master therein.”). 
 153 See Thomas L. Creel & Thomas McGahren, Use of Special Masters in Patent 
Litigation: A Special Master’s Perspective, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 109, 117 n.20 (1998) (“Special 
masters make findings that may then be offered in evidence.”); see also Crystal 
Semiconductor Corp. v. Tritech Microelectronics Int’l, Inc., 246 F.3d 1336, 1344 
(Fed. Cir. 2001).  The district court appointed a special master and adopted the 
special master’s claim construction.  Id.  The district court granted summary 
judgment based upon the claim construction.  Id.  On appeal, the CAFC affirmed the 
claim construction.  Id. at 1362. 
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judge in lieu of a special master.154  If the judge is unwilling to cede 
construction to a special master or magistrate, she may decide to 
appoint an expert to help explain technology requiring special 
expertise.155 
Whether or not a trial judge relies on a special master, 
magistrate or an expert, she may find it helpful to follow some preset 
procedure such as a pretrial conference under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 16.156  While some district courts may be testing their own 
local rules, to date only the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California has promulgated “Patent Local Rules” 
specifically for patent infringement cases.157  These patent rules are 
directed mainly to case management, setting out timelines for the 
management of the suit,158 disclosures of asserted claims and 
contentions,159 and claim construction proceedings.160  The judge 
“may accelerate, extend, eliminate, or modify the obligations or 
deadlines . . . based on the circumstances of any particular case.”161 
These Patent Local Rules set forth five steps leading up to the 
Markman Hearing.  First, the parties exchange proposed terms and 
claim elements.162  Next, the litigants exchange their preliminary 
claim constructions and lists of extrinsic evidence.163  The third step is 
a Joint Claim Construction and Prehearing Statement.164  Discovery 
 
 154 FED. R. CIV. P. 53(f); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(2) (1994).  A magistrate judge may be 
chosen under Section 636(b)(2) without the consent of the parties, but under Rule 
53(f) the magistrate may be chosen without the consent of the litigants only upon 
some exceptional circumstances.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 53(f) advisory committee’s note 
(1983 Amendments). 
 155 FED. R. EVID. 706; see also Mediacom Corp. v. Rates Tech., Inc., 4 F. Supp. 2d 
17, 29-30 & n.11 (D. Mass. 1998) (ordering the parties to “agree on an appropriate 
artisan” who understood the technology in order to educate the judge). 
 156 FED. R. CIV. P. 16. 
 157 N.D. C.A. USDC Patent L.R. 1-1 to 4-6 (2001) (formerly Civil Local Rules 16-6 
to 16-11 (1997) [hereinafter “Patent L.R.”]. 
 158 Patent L.R. 2-1. 
 159 Patent L.R. 3-1 to 3-7. 
 160 Patent L.R. 4-1 to 4-6. 
 161 Patent L.R. 1-2. 
 162 Patent L.R. 4-1.  This step takes place “[n]ot later than [ten] days after service 
of the ‘Preliminary Invalidity Contentions’ pursuant to Patent L.R. 3-3.”  Patent L.R. 
4-1(a). 
 163 Patent L.R. 4-2.  This takes place within twenty days of the events from L.R. 4-1.  
Patent L.R. 4-2(a).  The parties must exchange “a preliminary identification of 
extrinsic evidence, including . . . dictionary definitions, citations to learned treatise 
and prior art, and testimony of percipient and expert witnesses.”  Patent L.R. 4-2(b). 
 164 Patent L.R. 4-3.  This takes place within sixty days of step 2.  The statement 
includes the “construction of those claim terms, phrases, or clauses on which the 
parties agree.”  Patent L.R. 4-3(a).  The statement also includes each party’s 
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necessary for claim construction is performed within thirty days of 
serving and filing the Joint Claim Construction and Prehearing 
Statement.165  Next, claim construction briefs are submitted.166  Finally, 
the Markman Hearing begins within two weeks of the submission of 
any reply briefs.167  Unfortunately, that is where the Patent Local 
Rules end. 
Some commentators contend that the Northern District of 
California’s patent rules improve the litigation process.168  At the very 
least, the Patent Local Rules provide the trial court with some 
procedure to follow.  While the Northern District’s patent rules may 
be beneficial from a procedural standpoint, the true test is whether 
the CAFC reverses or affirms claim construction decisions made by 
the trial court.  Part III.C. will analyze the CAFC’s reversal rate for 
2001, including the cases from the Northern District of California 
presumably following the Patent Local Rules. 
2.  Substantive Resources 
There is surely no shortage of patent-related literature available 
to assist a trial court judge.  One patent text specifically for trial 
judges is Patent Law: A Primer for Federal District Court Judges 
(“Primer”).169  The Primer spends only two pages discussing the 
implications of Markman I and II,170 and another page and a half 
discussing appeals to the CAFC, contrasting certification of claim 
construction with entry of final judgment after claim construction.171  
Unfortunately, the Primer gives no guidance for actually conducting 
Markman Hearings.172 
 
construction of claims upon which they do not agree.  Patent L.R. 4-3(b). 
 165 Patent L.R. 4-4. 
 166 An opening brief shall be submitted within forty-five days of the Joint Claim 
Construction and Prehearing Statement.  Patent L.R. 4-5(a).  Responsive briefs are 
due within fourteen days of service of the opening brief.  Patent L.R. 4-5(b).  Any 
brief in reply to the responsive briefs are due within seven days.  Patent L.R. 4-5(c). 
 167 Patent L.R. 4-6 (“Subject to the convenience of the Court’s calendar, two weeks 
following submission of the reply brief . . . the Court shall conduct a Claim 
Construction Hearing, to the extent the parties or the Court believe a hearing is 
necessary.”). 
 168 Lee & Krug, supra note 142, at 79. (referring to the Northern District of 
California’s 1997 rules, which have been superceded by the 2001 Patent Local Rules) 
(“Because, under these rules, the parties must adhere to a variety of mandatory 
initial disclosures, the discovery process is more productive.”). 
 169 JAMES M. AMEND, PATENT LAW: A PRIMER FOR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT JUDGES 
(1998). 
 170 Id. at 15-16. 
 171 Id. at 17-18. 
 172 “It is beyond the scope of this Primer to discuss how the Markman [H]earing 
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The Federal Judicial Center provides three publications 
touching on relevant areas of patent law: the Manual for Complex 
Litigation (“Manual”), Patent Law and Practice, and the Reference 
Manual on Scientific Evidence.173  Notably, the Manual cautions against 
the use of a special master for pretrial management.174  Although the 
1995 edition of the Manual does not discuss Markman Hearings, the 
section on patents takes care to point out that “primary attention 
must be directed to the management of the technical aspects of 
patent cases.”175  In particular, the Manual provides that to “ensure a 
fair trial, whether it is by the court or a jury, comprehension of the 
issues and the evidence is critical.”176 
Comprehension of the issues starts with some education in the 
underlying technology of the patent at issue.  As former Judge 
McKelvie of the District of Delaware recently stated, education “starts 
with the trial judge, who even in cases that will be tried by a jury will 
need to understand the technology to handle and resolve matters 
such as discovery disputes, claim construction and pretrial 
motions.”177  Interestingly, the judge stated that “most judges do not 
take any particular or special steps to educate themselves on the 
technology in these cases.  They do not, for example, read scientific 
texts or literature in the field.  They rely on the lawyers to educate 
them.”178  The judge identified multiple ways to educate the trial 
judge, including general seminars on science, briefs and exhibits, 
tutorials by the litigants, video tapes on the technology, court 
appointed experts, and even law clerks.179 
 
should be conducted.”  Id. at 16. 
 173 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, THIRD (1995); PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 
(1995); REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (1994).  Hopefully, newer 
editions will reflect the changes in patent litigation brought on by Markman I and its 
progeny.  For more up to date information on claim construction, see HERBERT F. 
SCHWARTZ, PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE § 5 (Bureau of National Affairs 2001). 
 174 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, THIRD § 20.14. 
 175 Id. § 33.6.  The subsection on technology states that the “judge will often need 
some general explanation of the substance and terminology of the science . . . 
involved . . . before attempting to deal with the issues in the case or develop a plan 
for discovery and trial.”  Id. § 33.61. 
 176 Id. § 33.66. 
 177 Roderick R. McKelvie, Problems of Complex Litigation, 9 FED. CIR. B.J. 529, 531 
(2000).  Judge McKelvie was a United States District Court Judge for the District of 
Delaware. 
 178 Id. at 532. 
 179 Id. at 531-33.  The judge noted that some judges “will hire a law clerk who has a 
background or interest in science and intellectual property. . . .  These law clerks can 
be very helpful, even if the cases are not in the area he or she has studied.”  Id. at 
532. 
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Even if the trial judge understands the technology that is the 
subject of the claims, it would also be helpful for the judge to 
familiarize himself with resources used by patent practitioners.  For 
instance, if the judge understands how patent examiners perform 
claim construction, it cannot hurt when performing construction 
during litigation.  The place to start is the Manual of Patent Examining 
Procedure, colloquially known as the MPEP.180  As the forward to the 
MPEP notes, “[t]his Manual is published to provide [PTO] patent 
examiners, applicants, attorneys, agents, and representatives of 
applicants with a reference work on the practices and procedures 
relative to the prosecution of patent applications before the” PTO.181  
While the MPEP does not have the force of law,182 it is in accordance 
with Title 35 of the United States Code, Title 37 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations and relevant caselaw. 183 
To put it mildly, the MPEP is a voluminous tome including 
twenty-five chapters covering over 1300 pages,184 which does not 
include more than 600 pages of appendices and indices.  Many of the 
chapters are unrelated to claim construction issues.185  Other chapters 
provide helpful background material.186  The one chapter critical to 
an understanding of claim construction is chapter 2100, which covers 
patentability.187  Therefore, trial judges should be familiar with this 
particular chapter. 
For example, section 2106(C) explains generally how patent 
 
 180 See generally MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (8th ed. 2001) 
[hereinafter MPEP]. 
 181 Forward to MPEP. 
 182 In re Portola Packaging, Inc., 110 F.3d 786, 788 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“although 
[the MPEP] does not have the force of law, [it] provides guidance and instruction to 
examiners”); see also In re Beigel, 7 Fed. App. 959, 965 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“We note 
that the MPEP is not binding on this court . . . ‘although it does not have the force of 
law, [the MPEP] is well known to those registered to practice in the PTO and reflects 
the presumptions under which the PTO operates.’”) (citing Critikon, Inc. v. Becton 
Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); Molins PLC v. 
Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1180 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“While the MPEP does not have 
the force of law, it is entitled to judicial notice as an official interpretation of statutes 
or regulations as long as it is not in conflict therewith”); Forward to MPEP (“The 
Manual does not have the force of law or the force of the rules in Title 37 of the 
Code of Federal Regulations.”). 
 183 Introduction to MPEP. 
 184 MPEP §§ 100-2500. 
 185 See, e.g., MPEP §§ 500 (Receipt and Handling of Mail and Papers), 1100 
(Statutory Invention Registration) and 1500 (Design Patents). 
 186 See, e.g., MPEP §§ 600 (Parts, Form, and Content of Application) and 700 
(Examination of Application). 
 187 MPEP § 2100. 
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examiners should evaluate the claims.188  “Office personnel should 
begin claim analysis by identifying and evaluating each claim 
limitation. . . .  [They] are to correlate each claim limitation to all 
portions of the disclosure that describe the claim limitation.  This is 
to be done in all cases . . . [t]he correlation step will ensure that 
Office personnel correctly interpret each claim limitation.”189  The 
language of a claim must be carefully evaluated.190  Suggestive or 
optional language is not to be used to limit the scope of a claim.191 
Section 2111 examines the policy of providing claims their 
broadest reasonable interpretation.192  While seemingly in conflict 
with the narrow interpretation performed by a judge, both methods 
of claim construction further important policies.193  The broad 
reading by the examiner helps to “fashion claims that are precise, 
clear, correct, and unambiguous.”194  The narrow interpretation by 
the judge, as stated above, maintains the validity of the claim if 
possible.195 
Although claim terms should be given their plain meaning, the 
“applicant may be his or her own lexicographer as long as the 
meaning assigned to the term is not repugnant to the term’s well 
known usage.”196  Any non-standard definition should be clearly 
spelled out in the specification.197  Additionally, the preamble, or 
opening statement of the claim, is generally non-limiting.  In order to 
limit the claim, the preamble must be “‘necessary to give life, 
meaning, and vitality’ to the claim.”198  On the other hand, a 
transitional phrase linking the preamble to the body of the claim may 
 
 188 MPEP § 2106(C) tracks many of the canons of claim construction explained 
earlier. 
 189 MPEP § 2106(C). 
 190 Id. (“As a general matter, the grammar and intended meaning of terms used in 
a claim will dictate whether the language limits the claim scope.”). 
 191 Id. (A non-exhaustive list of such language includes “(A) statements of 
intended use or field of use, (B) ‘adapted to’ or ‘adapted for’ clauses, (C) ‘wherein’ 
clauses, or (D) ‘whereby’ clauses”). 
 192 MPEP § 2111. 
 193 Id. (referring to In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048 (Fed. Cir. 1997) for the 
proposition “that the PTO is not required, in the course of prosecution, to interpret 
claims in applications in the same manner as a court would interpret claims in an 
infringement suit”); see also In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 858-59 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 194 MPEP § 2106; see also Etter, 756 F.2d at 858. 
 195 See Weiss, supra note 7; see also Etter, 756 F.2d at 859. 
 196 MPEP § 2111.01 (relying on In re Hill, 161 F.2d 367 (C.C.P.A. 1947)). 
 197 Id. 
 198 Id § 2111.02 (quoting Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 
1305 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
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limit the claim if it is not open-ended.199 
Another suitable reference that may aid claim interpretation is a 
treatise entitled Landis on Mechanics of Patent Claim Drafting 
(“Landis”).200  Landis first discusses claim forms generally,201 followed 
by in-depth analysis of apparatus,202 method,203 article of 
manufacture,204 chemical,205 and biotechnology claims.206  Afterward, 
the author presents a chapter entitled “Thoughts on Writing a 
Claim,”207 including a subsection reviewing some claim drafting 
basics.208  The goal in suggesting Landis as a useful reference is not to 
turn trial court judges into patent attorneys, but rather to allow 
judges to become familiar with and understand claim format.209 
3.  Rules of Law—Canons of Claim Construction 
In addition to understanding the technology of the patent, the 
judge should apply some basic principles akin to statutory 
interpretation.  These are known as canons of claim construction, 
which generally comport with PTO guidelines for patent 
 
 199 MPEP § 2111.03.  The term ‘comprising’ is open-ended, and is “synonymous 
with ‘including,’ ‘containing,’ or ‘characterized by’ . . . and does not exclude 
additional, unrecited elements or method steps.”  ‘Comprising’ means ‘at least.’  Id.; 
see Bradford Co. v. Jefferson Smurfit Co., 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 25205 *17 (Fed. Cir. 
Oct. 30, 2001) (stating that “because the claims here contain the language 
‘comprising,’ the presence of additional [elements] in the accused device does not 
remove that device from the scope of the . . . patent claims”).  On the other hand, 
the “transitional phrase ‘consisting of’ excludes any element, step or ingredient not 
specified in the claim.”  MPEP § 2111.03.  “‘Consisting essentially of’ is a hybrid of 
these two terms, and “limits the scope of a claim to the specified materials or steps,” 
plus other materials or steps “‘not materially affect[ing] the basic and novel 
characteristic(s)’ of the invention.”  MPEP § 2111.03 (quoting In re Herz, 537 F.2d 
549, 551-52 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (emphasis in original).  Other terms, for example 
“‘composed of,’ ‘having,’ or ‘being’ must be interpreted in light of the specification 
to determine whether” the claim is open-ended or closed.  MPEP § 2111.03. 
 200 FABER, LANDIS ON MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING (4th ed. Release no. 5, 
Nov. 2001).  Other patent claim reference materials exist, such as KAYTON, 1 PATENT 
PRACTICE (6th ed. 1995), cited by Smith and Nephew, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 276 F.3d 
1304, 1310 (Fed Cir. 2001)), and KAHRL, supra note 139.  However, because LANDIS 
particularly focuses on claim drafting, it is a more apt reference than general texts. 
 201 FABER, supra note 200, §§ 4-13. 
 202 Id. §§ 14-35. 
 203 Id. §§ 36-44. 
 204 Id. §§ 45-48A. 
 205 Id. §§ 49-59. 
 206 FABER, supra note 200, §§ 70-81. 
 207 Id. at X-1 to X-55. 
 208 Id. at X-44 to X-55 (subsection written by Myron Cohen). 
 209 See Plager, supra note 16. 
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examiners.210  For instance, one canon states that unambiguous 
intrinsic evidence controls claim construction.211  Again, the purpose 
of extrinsic evidence is to help give the judge a foundation so that she 
may properly analyze the intrinsic evidence.212  Another important 
principle is that a claim term should be given its ordinary meaning 
unless the specification expressly uses the term in a different way.213  
The ordinary meaning is actually the meaning that a person skilled in 
the art at the time of the invention would attribute to the term.214 
Limitations disclosed in the specification should not be 
imported into a claim.215  Patents often include “preferred 
embodiments” in order to comport with the best mode requirement 
of 35 U.S.C. Section 112, first paragraph.216  If the specification 
provides broader support than a preferred embodiment, it is 
improper to limit a claim to the scope of the preferred 
embodiment.217  On the other hand, a claim should not be construed 
to exclude a preferred embodiment.218  A preferred embodiment can 
therefore be viewed as a floor as to claim scope—claims should 
generally be construed at least broadly enough to encompass a 
preferred embodiment, but are not necessarily limited to the 
preferred embodiment.  As the CAFC stated in Vitronics, a claim 
construction excluding a preferred embodiment “is rarely, if ever, 
correct and would require highly persuasive evidentiary support.”219 
 
 210 See Weiss, supra note 7, at 151-59.  One canon in conflict with PTO guidelines 
of the MPEP is for the judge to read a claim narrowly (if possible) in order to 
preserve validity.  See Rhine v. Casio, Inc., 183 F.3d 1342, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 1999).  In 
contrast, patent examiners must give claims their broadest reasonable construction.  
In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054-55 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also MPEP § 2106(C). 
 211 Weiss, supra note 7, at 151. 
 212 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en 
banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
 213 Weiss, supra note 7, at 152; see also Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chemicals 
Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Renishaw PLC. v. Marposs Societa’ Per 
Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 214 Weiss, supra note 7, at 152. 
 215 Id. at 154. 
 216 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 1 (1994).  “The specification shall . . . set forth the best 
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out the invention.” 
 217 Weiss, supra note 7, at 155 (citing Ekchian v. Home Depot, Inc., 104 F.3d 1299, 
1303 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).  However, when the specification is limited to a preferred 
embodiment, the scope of the claims should not exceed that of the preferred 
embodiment.  Id. (citing Modine Mfg. Co. v. ITC, 75 F.3d 1545, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 
1996); Wang Labs v. America Online, Inc., 197 F.3d 1337, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
 218 Id. at 155. 
 219 Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronics, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
(rejecting the trial court’s construction of the term ‘solder reflow temperature’ 
because it excluded the only preferred embodiment in the specification). 
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Patent claims are presumed valid.220  Therefore, claims should be 
construed so as to maintain validity if possible.221  Given a choice 
between two possible constructions, one that would preserve validity 
and another that would render the claim invalid, the judge should 
choose the one preserving validity absent a compelling reason not 
to.222  This may require interpreting the claim narrowly, which is the 
opposite of what is done by the patent examiner.223 
Another helpful canon deals with claim differentiation.224  A 
patent will often include sets of claims of varying scope.225  For 
example, a “picture claim” may cover a specific embodiment, or 
species, of the invention, while a genus claim may include all 
embodiments presented in the specification.226  In that situation, the 
language of the picture claim should not limit the scope of the genus 
claim.227 
Many of the cases from 2001 involved one or more canons of 
claim construction.228  The discussion above provides an initial look at 
the canons of claim construction, but an exhaustive analysis of them 
is beyond the scope of this Comment.  However, since many claim 
constructions were reversed because of an error involving a canon, 
the CAFC should provide clearer guidance so that trial judges can 
avoid such pitfalls in the future. 
III.  CAFC REVERSAL RATES: TRIAL JUDGES ARE NOT GETTING BETTER 
AT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION 
Collecting statistical data concerning patent litigation is not 
straightforward.  While the Administrative Office of the United States 
Courts compiles statistics on cases by subject matter, it does not 
provide in-depth reporting of the cases.229  For example, the reports 
do not indicate whether judges actually conduct Markman Hearings.  
 
 220 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1994) (stating that “[a] patent shall be presumed valid”). 
 221 Weiss, supra note 7, at 156. 
 222 Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland Golf Co., 242 F.3d 1376, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 223 MPEP Section 2106(C) provides that “[o]ffice personnel are to give claims 
there broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the supporting disclosure.”  
MPEP § 2106(C). 
 224 Weiss, supra note 7, at 159. 
 225 Karsten, 242 F.3d at 1385 (noting that “it is customary for patentees to present 
claims of varying scope or stated in a variety of ways”). 
 226 FABER, supra note 200, § 60. 
 227 Weiss, supra note 7, at 159. 
 228 See infra Part III.D; see also infra app. B. 
 229 See Moore, supra note 56 (providing an exhaustive statistical analysis of 1411 
patent cases from 1983-1999).  The purpose of the article was to examine whether it 
mattered if the fact-finder was either the judge or the jury.  Id. 
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Also, the reports do not show how often trial judges are reversed on 
claim construction decisions.  This section attempts to answer these 
questions.  In doing so, the hope is to illuminate at least a part of the 
patent litigation process, with an eye towards improving the 
effectiveness of trial judge claim construction. 
As an initial matter, it is relevant to put patent litigation in 
perspective with regard to other kinds of litigation.  For instance, it 
has been reported that from 1994 through 1998, approximately 
243,000 civil cases were filed annually in the federal district courts, 
including a yearly average of about 1,700 patent cases.230  This 
averages out to patent litigation representing about 0.7% of all civil 
litigation filed during those years.  One study found that over a 
recent five-year period, trial judges averaged less than one patent case 
per year.231  During the same time span, the CAFC heard 
approximately 800 patent cases on appeal.232 
Even the average number of patent cases per judge is 
misleading.  From 1989 through 1996, only seven district courts 
heard at least ten patent cases.233  The District Court for the Southern 
District of New York led the list with twenty-three patent cases over 
the seven-year span.234  Even the Northern District of California only 
had ten patent cases.235  Thus, trial judges are simply not afforded an 
opportunity to hear a significant number of patent cases.236  This lack 
of exposure, combined with complex technology and confusing claim 
language, is a recipe for improper claim construction.237 
 
 230 McKelvie, supra note 177, at 530 (citing statistics for criminal cases, civil cases, 
and patent-related cases filed in the U. S. district courts). 
 231 See Plager, supra note 16, at 77 (Judge Plager and a law clerk examined 1250 
published district court cases over a five-year period, finding that “each trial judge 
heard three plus cases over the five year period”). 
 232 Id. (“[E]ach [CAFC] judge hears about a fourth of the court’s caseload”); see 
also Judge Richard Linn, Judge Richard Linn Speaks at 2001 Annual Meeting (Oct. 
19, 2001), in AIPLA BULLETIN – 2001 ANNUAL MEETING ISSUE, December 2001, at 7: 
In the last fiscal year, the [CAFC] decided 900 cases . . . of which about 
1/3 were patent cases.  Of the patent cases appealed from the district 
courts (308 cases), 12 percent were reversed; 18 percent were affirmed 
in part or reversed in part.  Of the cases on appeal from the PTO (58 
cases), 12 percent were reversed; 3 percent were affirmed in part or 
reversed in part. 
Id. 
 233 Allison & Lemley, supra note 6, at 247. 
 234 Id. 
 235 Id. 
 236 Out of the ninety-four cases heard on appeal in 2001, only four trial court 
judges had been part of more than one decision (J. Dimitrouleas, S.D. Fl. (two); J. 
McKelvie, D. Del. (three); J. Van Sickle, D. Az. (two); J. Wright, W.D. Mo. (two)). 
 237 Two out of the four judges involved in more than one claim construction had 
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According to the CAFC’s own statistics, the reversal rates for 
patent cases appealed from the district courts and the PTO over a 
recent four-year period breaks down as shown in table 1. 
TABLE 1: CAFC REVERSAL RATES FOR SELECTED COURTS, 
10/1/96 TO 9/30/00238 
YEAR District Courts PTO 
10/1/96 – 9/30/97 27% 0% 
10/1/97 – 9/30/98 19% 23% 
10/1/98 – 9/30/99 21% 17% 
10/1/99 – 9/30/00 16% 17% 
 
One detailed study of patent cases from 1983-1999 by Kimberly 
Moore found that, of the 1209 cases resolved by a fact finder, 51% 
 
all of their constructions affirmed (J. Dimitrouleas and J. McKelvie), one judge had 
one of the two cases reversed (J. Van Sickle), and one judge had both constructions 
reversed (J. Wright).  While the sample size is too small to make firm predictions, as 
judges perform more claim constructions they will likely have more success (i.e., 
claim constructions affirmed by the CAFC).  It should come as no surprise that J. 
McKelvie’s decisions were all affirmed on appeal.  See William J. Marsden, Jr., 
Delaware District is Top Choice for Patent Disputes, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 27, 2000, at C3 
(stating that “Judge McKelvie has spurred many reforms in the way patent cases are 
prepared and tried and has championed the Delaware District Court as a patent trial 
court”); see also The Honorable Roderick R. McKelvie, Side Bar: Markman v. Westview 
and Procedures for Construing Claims, in PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 1065, 1067 (Donald S. Chisum et al. eds., 1998): 
Recently, one of our district judges left me a problem that may turn out 
to be the solution . . . I scheduled the pretrial conference for two weeks 
before trial and a separate hearing on claim construction pursuant to 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b), to be held one week before trial. . . .  We avoided 
additional delay getting the case to the jury.  And after reading the 
draft pretrial order submitted by the parties, I felt comfortable that I 
could put the claim construction disputes in context. 
Id. 
 238 Table B-8 U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit-Appeals Filed, 
Terminated, and Pending During the Twelve-Month Period Ending September 30, 
1997, at http://www.fedcir.gov/pdf/b08sep97.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2002); Table 
B-8 U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit-Appeals Filed, Terminated, and 
Pending During the Twelve-Month Period Ending September 30, 1998, at 
http://www.fedcir.gov/pdf/b08sep98.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2002); Table B-8 U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit-Appeals Filed, Terminated, and Pending 
During the Twelve-Month Period Ending September 30, 1999, at 
http://www.fedcir.gov/pdf/b08sep99.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2002); Table B-8 U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit-Appeals Filed, Terminated, and Pending 
During the Twelve-Month Period Ending September 30, 2000, at 
http://www.fedcir.gov/pdf/b08sep00.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2002). 
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(620) of the decisions were appealed.239  Of those cases, the CAFC 
reversed 22% (282) in some form.240  The Moore study focused on 
judge versus jury fact-finding and did not analyze claim construction 
decisions.241  On the other hand, much scholarly work has been 
devoted to the effects of Markman I, particularly with respect to the 
timing of Markman Hearings.242 
A.  Claim Construction and Markman Hearings: The ABA Surveys 
The American Bar Association (ABA) Section of Intellectual 
Property, Committee 601, is one group that attempts to track some of 
the elements of Markman Hearings.243  Committee 601, dealing with 
federal practice and procedure, surveyed its own members in 1997 
and 1998 regarding “practices and timing adopted by trial courts to 
interpret patent claims” in 1996 and 1997, respectively.244  In 2000, 
Committee 601 surveyed the entire ABA Section of Intellectual 
Property with similar questions covering 1999.245 
While the sample sizes of the various surveys were small, they 
illustrate the activities of various trial courts.  The 1997 survey 
covered nineteen cases through the end of 1996.246  The 1998 survey 
included twenty-six cases from 1997.247  The 2000 survey “yielded 
seventy-one responses about practices in thirty-three different district 
court jurisdictions from ten different federal circuits (all but the First 
 
 239 Moore, supra note 56, at 397. 
 240 Id. 
 241 Id. at 368. 
 242 See generally Austrian & Mohler, supra note 57, at 229-46 (1999) (explaining 
various approaches to the Markman Hearing, ground rules for the hearing, 
preparing the judge for the hearing, and arguing that Markman Hearings should be 
held separately from summary judgment motions); David H. Binney & Toussaint L. 
Myricks, Patent Claim Interpretation After Markman – How Have the Trial Courts Adapted?, 
38 IDEA 155 (1997) (reviewing cases where the trial courts have held Markman 
Hearings at various stages of litigation, but not evaluating the resulting CAFC 
decisions, if any.  The article provides a useful table of cases including the evidence 
considered by the trial court); John B. Pegram, Markman and Its Implications, 78 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 560 (1996) (an early article presenting various 
alternatives that district courts have regarding Markman Hearings); Lee & Krug, 
supra note 142, at 70-85 (reviewing the timing of Markman Hearings at various points 
in litigation). 
 243 American Bar Association Section of Intellectual Property Law 1999 Markman Survey, 
IPL NEWSLETTER, Spring 2000, vol. 18, no. 3, 12 (2000). 
 244 Id. 
 245 Id. 
 246 Markman Proceedings Survey Update, IPL NEWSLETTER, Spring 1998, vol. 16, no. 3, 
28-32 (1998). 
 247 Id. at 33-37. 
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Circuit)” concerning cases from 1999.248  As the following table 
indicates, trial courts predominantly performed claim construction 
after the close of discovery. 
TABLE 2: ABA SURVEY RESULTS ON CLAIM CONSTRUCTION TIMING 
Year Before or During Discovery After Discovery 
Pre-1997249 39 % 61% 
1997250 15% 85% 
1999251 29.7% 70.3% 
 
The 2000 survey noted that courts often admitted extrinsic 
evidence while performing claim construction, and that such 
evidence was ultimately relied on in 48.9% of the decisions.252  
Notably, 81.5% of the judges held some sort of Markman Hearing.253  
The 2000 ABA survey noted that six cases were appealed to the 
CAFC.254  The CAFC reversed five out of the six appealed cases.255  In 
contrast, of the ninety-four cases decided by the CAFC involving 
claim construction in 2001, the trial courts held approximately forty-
one Markman Hearings.256  Seventeen, or 41.5%, of the cases having 
 
 248 American Bar Association Section of Intellectual Property Law 1999 Markman Survey, 
IPL NEWSLETTER, Spring 2000, vol. 18, no. 3, at 12. 
 249 Markman Proceedings Survey Update, IPL NEWSLETTER, Spring 1998, vol. 16, no. 3, 
at 29 (presented as part of a pie chart). 
 250 Id. 
 251 American Bar Association Section of Intellectual Property Law 1999 Markman Survey, 
IPL NEWSLETTER, Spring 2000, vol. 18, no. 3, 14 (aggregating separate answers to 
question 4 of the survey).  In particular, 7.8% of the courts performed claim 
construction prior to discovery, 21.9% during discovery, 57.8% after discovery but 
before trial, 6.25% during trial, but before closing arguments, and 6.25% during 
trial, but after closing arguments.  Id. 
 252 Id. (question 11).  The results from question 11 came from subparts to 
question 10.  Id.  Question 10 listed extrinsic evidence types that included technical 
and legal expert testimony, inventor and non-inventor factual testimony, and prior 
patents or publications.  Id.  However, the question did not include dictionaries or 
treatise.  Id. 
 253 Id. (Question 12). 
 254 Id. (Questions 24 and 25).  Results of both questions were presented with a 
caution because of the extremely small sample size.  Id.  Later in this section, the 
article will examine the overall reversal rates of the CAFC.  See infra Parts III.B & C. 
 255 American Bar Association Section of Intellectual Property Law 1999 Markman Survey, 
IPL NEWSLETTER, Spring 2000, vol. 18, no. 3, 14. 
 256 See infra app. A, column “MH Held?” (identifying which trial courts held 
Markman Hearings).  The analysis identified cases as holding a Markman Hearing 
only when the CAFC or lower court decision expressly stated that a Markman 
Hearing, claim construction hearing or evidentiary hearing took place (in DoorKing, 
Inc. v. Sentex Sys. Inc., 19 Fed. Appx. 872 (Fed. Cir. 2001), the trial judge heard oral 
arguments as to claim-related evidence.  This was counted as a Markman Hearing).  
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Markman Hearings had their claim construction reversed on 
appeal.257  This rate is no better than the overall claim construction 
reversal rate for all cases in 2001.258 
Some of the practitioners who responded to the 2000 ABA 
survey provided constructive recommendations.  For example, in 
response to a question about whether the court limited discovery 
before holding a Markman Hearing, one practitioner stated that 
“[e]arly hearing after some discovery works well, but will not always 
be outcome determinative on [sic] cause settlement often, the battle 
is merely shifted to ‘interpreting’ the court’s ‘interpretation.’”259  
Another attorney stated that “some substantive guidance and 
requirements have to be placed upon judges in order to maximize 
the usefulness of the Markman procedure.”260 
More than one practitioner commented on the technical 
expertise of the court (or lack thereof).  For example, one attorney 
noted that the use of a special master261 (in this case a patent 
attorney) by the court was very useful.  “He sat side-by-side with the 
judge and asked a number of intelligent questions.”262  Whether the 
use of the special master helped formulate a correct claim 
construction is unknown.  On the other hand, a different practitioner 
stated that “[f]requently district courts are unable to cope with the 
subject matter and fail to understand the claims.  Also, they may be 
confused between the [role] of the specification, original claims as 
filed and as finally allowed.  The law clerks typically are ignorant of 
patent law, science and technology.”263  A lack of familiarity of the 
 
It is likely that at least a few trial courts held a Markman Hearing without this fact 
being identified in an opinion.  At least one court held multiple Markman Hearings, 
see for example Generation II Orthotics, Inc. v. Medical Techn., Inc., 263 F.3d 1356, 
1363 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction reversed.  See infra note 271 for a fuller 
discussion of the research methodology. 
 257 See infra app. A, columns “MH Held?” and “Rev’d CC” (identifying which trial 
courts held Markman Hearings and which claim constructions based upon Markman 
Hearings were reversed). 
 258 See infra Table 4 and accompanying text. 
 259 ABA Section of Intellectual Property, Committee 601, 1999 Markman Survey 
Practitioner Response No. 106, Comment to Question 7 (on file with author). 
 260 ABA Section of Intellectual Property, Committee 601, 1999 Markman Survey 
Practitioner Response No. 118, Comment to Question 18 (on file with author).  A 
main goal of this Comment is to help provide some substantive guidance the 
practitioner sought. 
 261 See supra notes 152-153 and accompanying text. 
 262 ABA Section of Intellectual Property, Committee 601, 1999 Markman Survey 
Practitioner Response No. 130, Comment to Question 6 (on file with author). 
 263 ABA Section of Intellectual Property, Committee 601, 1999 Markman Survey 
Practitioner Response No. 164. (on file with author). 
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subject matter may encourage the use of summary judgment 
proceedings to expedite the case to the CAFC. 
B.  Summary Judgment in Claim Construction Cases 
The ABA surveys were fairly thorough, but did not ask 
practitioners how often judges ruling on cases involving claim 
construction granted summary judgment.  As the article by Weiss 
noted, “[g]iven the apparent reluctance of some courts to schedule 
[Markman] [H]earings, parties often resort to filing summary 
judgment motions in the hope that the court will hold a Markman 
hearing to decide the claim construction issue, even if the overall 
summary judgment motion is unsuccessful.”264  The authors of the 
Weiss article found that trial judges decided more patent cases by 
summary judgment after Markman I than before.265  In particular, the 
authors discovered that in 24% of about 930 cases from Markman I to 
June 26, 2000 the trial judge granted by summary judgment, as 
compared with 12% of a comparable number of cases pre-Markman 
I.266  The same survey found that summary judgment resulted in a 
finding of non-infringement 87% of the time post-Markman I, while 
only 77% of the time pre-Markman I.267 
Of the ninety-four cases decided by the CAFC involving claim 
construction in 2001, fifty-four cases involved summary judgment 
decisions by the lower court.268  The CAFC overturned more than half 
of the summary judgment decisions on appeal.269  Such a high 
reversal rate suggests that motions for summary judgment are merely 
used as a mechanism to allow an early appeal and have the CAFC 
deduce a “correct” claim construction.  However, if the trial judge 
correctly performed claim construction at the outset, the time delays 
and additional costs of the summary judgment appeal process would 
 
 264 Weiss, supra note 7, at 149; see also Linn, supra note 232, at 7 (“The [CAFC] 
continues to hear a large percentage of cases involving claim construction issues.  
Many of the cases come to us on summary judgment following a Markman hearing or 
on appeal from the grant of a preliminary injunction.”). 
 265 Weiss, supra note 7, at 148-49. 
 266 Id. at 149. 
 267 Id. at 149 n.62. 
 268 See infra app. A, column “Rev’d SJ” (identifying which cases involving summary 
judgment at the trial court were reversed).  “Yes” indicates reversal of summary 
judgment.  “No” indicates affirmance of summary judgment.  No marking indicates 
there was no summary judgment.  See infra note 271 for a fuller discussion of the 
research methodology. 
 269 The CAFC reversed twenty-eight of the fifty-four summary judgment decisions, 
or 51.85%, on appeal.  Any summary judgment reversed in whole or in part counted 
as a reversal of summary judgment. 
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be eliminated.  Table 3 presents the claim construction cases heard 
by the CAFC that also involved summary judgment. 
TABLE 3: SUMMARY JUDGMENT DECISIONS INVOLVING CLAIM 
CONSTRUCTION IN 2001270 
Trial Court 
# of Appealed Cases 
Involving 
Summary Judgment 
# of Summary 
Judgments 
Reversed 
% of Summary 
Judgments 
Reversed 
N.D. Cal. 8 2 25.0% 
C.D. Cal. 6 4 66.7% 
N.D. Ill. 4 3 75.0% 
S.D.N.Y. 3 1 33.3% 
Top 4 Courts 21 10 47.6% 
Other Courts 33 18 54.5% 
Total 54 28 51.9% 
C.  Study of Claim Construction Cases Heard by the CAFC in 2001 
This author evaluated all claim construction cases examined by 
the CAFC (published and unpublished) during the calendar year 
2001.271  The CAFC ruled on claim constructions by lower courts in 
 
 270 Table 3 is excerpted from app. A.  The four courts that had the most appeals 
(not necessarily the most summary judgments) heard by the CAFC are shown 
individually, and the overall total for all courts is shown in the last row. 
 271 The author researched CAFC decisions from 2001 using the LEXIS and 
Westlaw computerized databases.  Published and unpublished cases were both 
included in the analysis.  Any case discussing or mentioning “Markman Hearing” or 
“claim construction” was evaluated to determine whether claim construction was at 
issue on appeal.  Claim construction decisions that were reversed in whole, in part or 
implicitly (e.g., the CAFC provided a claim construction different that that of the 
trial court) were counted as reversing the lower court’s claim construction.  The 
collected data include: date, case name, citation, trial court, trial court judge, 
whether the trial judge held a Markman Hearing, whether the trial court ruling came 
at summary judgment, whether the CAFC reversed summary judgment, whether the 
CAFC reversed the claim construction of the trial court, the evidence examined by 
both the trial court and the CAFC (e.g., types of intrinsic and extrinsic evidence 
examined) (not shown in the appendices), and the reason(s) (if any was articulated) 
why the CAFC reversed the claim construction and/or summary judgment.  Not all 
of this data appeared in every decision by the CAFC.  When possible, the omitted 
data was obtained by analyzing the trial court decision.  Appendix A includes the 
case name, citation, whether a Markman Hearing was held (“Yes” = held), whether 
claim construction was reversed (“Yes” = reversed), and whether summary judgment 
was reversed (“Yes” = reversed).  Appendix B includes the case name and key points 
noted by the author from the CAFC decision.  Appendix C includes the case name, 
the lower court, and the trial judge (including whether a magistrate was employed).  
For data that is missing or unclear, the appendices represent it with either an empty 
box or with “??”  The author takes full responsibility for any errors in analyzing the 
cases. 
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ninety-four cases.272  The next question is how do trial court claim 
construction decisions hold up on appeal overall. 
One article that did analyze CAFC claim construction decisions 
came up with somewhat surprising findings.  In contrast to the 40% 
reversal quoted by the dissent in Cybor, Thad Adams III and Derel 
Monteith, Jr. found that for 1998 and part of 1999 the CAFC reversed 
only 25% of claim construction decisions.273  However, the survey only 
examined thirty-four cases.274  The survey excluded six cases from the 
analysis because the lower court decisions were either pre-Markman I 
or were not from district courts.275  In part, this may be attributed to 
the fact that post-Markman I appeals from district court cases were 
slowly working their way to the CAFC in 1998.  The sample size of 
only twenty-eight cases may hint that trial courts are getting better at 
claim construction, or it may be too small to be statistically reliable. 
A more detailed study by Christian A. Chu came up with similar 
results.276  Chu analyzed 179 cases wherein the CAFC provided an 
express review of claim construction.277  Chu found that the CAFC 
reversed 29.6% of these cases.278  Another study by Kimberly A. Moore 
found that the district courts erred in their claim construction in 28% 
of the cases prior to 2001.279  A detailed study by Gretchen Ann 
Bender found that the CAFC reversed approximately 40% of 160 trial 
court claim constructions from the time of Markman I through 
2000.280  These reversal rates, ranging between 28% and 40%, suggest 
that the trial courts have not improved the quality of their claim 
constructions. 
In the study conducted for purposes of this Comment, the CAFC 
reversed thirty-nine of the ninety-four claim construction decisions by 
 
 272 See Appendix A for a complete listing of all the cases from 2001 in which the 
CAFC ruled on claim construction issues. 
 273 W. Thad Adams, III & J. Derel Monteith, Jr, The Continuing Saga of Federal 
Circuit Patent Claim Construction Jurisprudence: Extrinsic Evidence and Other Stories, 8 FED. 
CIR. B.J. 83 (1999). 
 274 Id. at 100 (Appendix: Summaries of Claim Construction Decisions in 1998-99 
Reported Federal Circuit Cases). 
 275 Id. at 99. 
 276 Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction 
Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075 (2001). 
 277 Id. at 1104. 
 278 Id. (noting that the CAFC modified the claim interpretation for 78 of the 179 
cases, and reversed 53 of those 78 cases). 
 279 Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 
HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 1, 11 (2001).  Moore tabulated 323 cases appealed to the CAFC 
between April 23, 1996 and December 31, 2000. 
 280 Bender, supra note 15, at 205-07. 
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lower courts (41.5%) in 2001, either in whole or in part.281  This 
analysis did not exclude courts besides the federal district courts.  
Thus, cases from the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences 
(two), the Court of Federal Claims (one), and the International 
Trade Commission (two) were all evaluated and included.282  Such a 
high reversal rate clearly suggests that in general the trial courts are 
not performing any better than at a time just after Markman I.283 
The following table presents the results for appeals from the 
four district courts that had the most claim construction decisions 
reviewed by the CAFC, with a minimum of five cases.  It also presents 






 281 See Appendix A.  Notably, this reversal rate matches the percentage of cases 
wherein the lower court performed some sort of Markman Hearing but the claim 
construction was reversed on appeal; see supra notes 256-257 and accompanying text 
(forty-one cases in 2001 held some form of Markman hearing, yet seventeen cases 
were found to have faulty claim construction).  Such a result—coupled with the 
reversal rate for cases from the Northern District of California, see infra Table 4—
clearly shows that the procedural requirements of Markman I have, at best, minimal 
affect on the correctness of the trial court claim constructions. 
 282 Of the five cases from these three courts, the CAFC reversed three of five claim 
construction decisions.  In Re Roemer, 258 F.3d 1303, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim 
construction reversed); see also Rapoport v. Dement, 254 F.3d 1053, 1060 (Fed. Cir. 
2001) (claim construction affirmed); Oak Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 248 
F.3d 1316, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction affirmed); Winbond Electronics 
Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 4 Fed. App. 832, 843 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim 
construction reversed); Exxon Research and Engineering Co. v. United States, 265 
F.3d 1371, 1382-83 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction reversed). 
 283 See supra text accompanying note 13.  This reversal rate runs contrary to an 
impression of Judge Richard Linn of the CAFC, who recently noted that “[t]he 
district courts are now quite familiar with the analytical rules of claim construction, 
and claim construction decisions are now admirably focused and on point . . . [t]he 
increasing familiarity of the district courts with the claim construction process is 
being reflected in their decisions, and reversal rates are going down.”  Linn, supra note 
232, at 9 (emphasis added). 
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TABLE 4: CLAIM CONSTRUCTION CASES 
DECIDED BY THE CAFC IN 2001284 
Trial Court 










N.D. Cal. 11 6 54.5% 
C.D. Cal. 9 3 33.3% 
N.D. Ill. 7 2 28.6% 
S.D.N.Y. 5 1 20.0% 
Top 4 Courts 32 12 37.5% 
Other Courts 62 27 43.5% 
Total 94 39 41.5% 
 
The Northern District of California, the Central District of 
California, the Northern District of Illinois and the Southern District 
of New York originally heard thirty-two of the ninety-four cases.  
While their reversal rate was lower than the overall claim construction 
reversal rate of 41.5%, one would hope that the courts getting the 
greatest number of patent cases would have more experience, 
resulting in better claim construction and distinctly lower reversal 
rates.  Particularly distressing is that the Northern District of 
California, with its Patent Local Rules, had more than half of its claim 
construction decisions reversed on appeal.285  The procedural patent 
 
 284 Table 4 is a much abbreviated version of the complete table of cases presented 
in Appendix A. 
 285 Asyst Technologies, Inc. v. Empak, Inc., 268 F.3d 1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(claim construction reversed); see also Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer 
Group, Inc., 236 F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction affirmed); 
Amphenol Corp. v. Maxconn Inc., 4 Fed. App. 928, 929 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim 
construction affirmed); SciMed Life Sys. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc., 
242 F.3d 1337, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction affirmed); Telemac 
Cellular Corp. v. Topp Telecom., Inc., 247 F.3d 1316, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim 
construction affirmed); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Space Systems/Loral Inc., 249 
F.3d 1314, 1324, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2001), vacated and remanded, 122 S. Ct. 2349 (2002) 
(claim construction reversed, but the summary judgment ruling was affirmed); 
Budde v. Harely-Davidson, Inc., 250 F.3d 1369, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim 
construction reversed); Semitool, Inc. v. Novellus Sys., 12 Fed. App. 918, 925-26, 928 
(Fed. Cir. 2001), vacated and remanded, 122 S. Ct. 2323 (2002) (claim construction 
reversed, but the summary judgment ruling was affirmed); S3 Inc. v. NVIDIA Corp., 
259 F.3d 1364, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (reversing the lower court ruling that the claims 
were indefinite—counted as reversing claim construction); MSM Investments Co., 
LLC v. Carolwood Corp., 259 F.3d 1335, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that 
although the district court’s claim construction was incomplete, it was at most 
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rules merely lead up to Markman Hearings in an efficient manner 
but do not direct the district court how to properly perform claim 
construction.  Therefore, to have any hope of improving reversal 
rates, it is critical to examine why the CAFC is reversing the trial 
courts’ claim construction. 
The CAFC decided six cases in 2001 in which a magistrate judge 
conducted the claim construction.286  Notably, the CAFC reversed 
only one of the six claim constructions.287  While it is too small a 
sample size, these results suggest that the use of magistrate judges 
might improve claim constructions. 
D.  Reasons Why the CAFC Reversed Trial Court Claim Constructions 
One of the leading reasons288 the CAFC reversed trial court claim 
construction decisions in 2001 was the trial court’s improper 
importation of limitations from the specification into the claims, 
which occurred in eight cases.289  For instance, unless the patentee 
acted as his own lexicographer and defined a claim element in a 
specific manner, the person performing claim construction should 
construe the element “according to its ordinary and accustomed 
meaning, rather than importing a characteristic of a disclosed or 
 
harmless error—counted as reversing the claim construction); Advanced 
Cardiovascular Systems, Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc, 265 F.3d 1294, 1297, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 
2001) (claim construction affirmed).  Note that these cases were presumably 
conducted under the 1997 local rules.  However, being procedural in nature, it is 
unlikely that the newer 2001 Patent Local Rules will result in reduced reversal rates. 
 286 Sandt Tech. v. Resco Metal and Plastics, 264 F.3d 1344, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(claim construction affirmed); see also Day Int’l, Inc. v. Reeves Bros., Inc., 260 F.3d 
1343, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction affirmed); Circle R, Inc. v. Trail King 
Industries, Inc., 21 Fed. App. 894, 898 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction 
reversed); Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 276 F.3d 1304, 1308-11 (Fed. Cir. 
2001) (claim construction affirmed); Schoell v. Regal Marine Industries, Inc., 247 
F.3d 1202, 1208-09 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction affirmed); Newell Window 
Furnishings v. Springs Window Fashions Div., Inc., 15 Fed. App. 836, 840-41 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001) (claim construction affirmed). 
 287 Circle R, 21 Fed. App. at 898 (claim construction reversed). 
 288 See infra Appendix B for a listing of key points from the cases, including 
reasons why the trial court erred in its claim construction and relevant topics 
discussed in the cases. 
 289 See Generation II Orthotics, Inc. v. Medical Tech., 263 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001); Dow Chem. Co. v. Sumitomo Chem. Co., Ltd., 257 F.3d 1364, 1379 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001); Dayco Products, Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 258 F.3d 1317, 1327 
(Fed. Cir. 2001); Interactive Gift Express Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 
1338 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Circle R, Inc., v. Trail King Indus., Inc., 21 Fed. Appx. 894, 898 
(Fed. Cir. 2001); Turbocare Div. of Demag Delaval Turbomachinery Corp. v. General 
Electric Co., 264 F.3d 1111, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Innovad Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 
260 F.3d 1326, 1331-33 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Gart v. Logitech, Inc., 254 F.3d 1334, 1342-
43 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
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preferred embodiment.”290  One way to avoid this critical error is to 
evaluate the specification as a whole, rather than to choose bits and 
pieces of the specification to support a given claim construction.291  As 
the CAFC noted in Budde v. Harley-Davidson, “it is necessary to 
consider the specification as a whole, and to read all portions of the 
written description, if possible, in a manner that renders the patent 
internally consistent.”292  Merely looking at the “summary” and 
“objects of the invention” sections of the specification can lead to an 
incorrect claim construction.293  However, “clear guidance” from the 
specification does not lead to improper importation.294 
A more subtle error occurs when the trial court performs claim 
construction from a perspective other than one of ordinary skill in 
the art.  Because the statutory requirement is for the patent to teach 
one of ordinary skill to practice the invention,295 employing a 
different viewpoint may lead to improper construction.296  The 
ordinary skill viewpoint can be particularly troublesome because it 
represents a hypothetical person who may have a combination of 
qualities not found in any real person.297  Because it is often an elusive 
 
 290 Generation II Orthotics, 263 F.3d at 1367. 
 291 Interactive Gift Express, 256 F.3d at 1335 (citing Digital Biometrics, Inc. v. 
Identix, Inc, 149 F.3d 1335, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 1998) for the proposition that claim 
construction should be derived from the entire written description although an 
isolated passage was in conflict with the rest of the written description). 
 292 Budde, 250 F.3d at 1379-80. 
 293 Id. at 1377. 
 294 Unique Coupons, Inc. v. Northfield Corp., 12 Fed. App. 928, 935 (Fed. Cir. 
2001) (“Although there is a fine line between interpreting claim language in light of 
the specification and reading a limitation . . . into the claim . . . we do not improperly 
cross that line when we interpret [a claim term] consistently with the clear guidance 
in the specification.”). 
 295 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 1 (1994). 
 296 Budde, 250 F.3d at 1380 (stating that “it is important to construe claim 
language through the ‘viewing glass’ of a person skilled in the art”); see also MPEP § 
2141.03 (“The examiner must ascertain what would have been obvious to one of 
ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made, and not to the inventor, 
a judge, a layman, those skilled in remote arts, or to geniuses in the art at hand.”) 
(citing Environmental Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693 (Fed. Cir. 1983), 
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984); see also Dow Chem. Co. v. Sumitomo Chem. Co., 
257 F.3d 1364, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (in reversing the lower court’s  claim 
construction, Judge Gajarsa posited “the question before us is not whether the ‘255 
patent teaches that the boiling point should be measured in the vapor phase; as 
discussed above, one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that the ordinary 
meaning of a codistillate boiling point involves measuring the temperature in the 
vapor phase”). 
 297 MPEP § 2141.03.  Factors may include the education levels of the inventor and 
others in the field, problems in the art, solutions previously employed in the art to 
resolve the problems, the innovation level in the art, and the technological 
complexity of the art.  Id. (citing Environmental Designs, 713 F.2d at 696). 
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standard, extrinsic evidence related to ordinary skill should be 
considered by the trial judge when performing claim construction.  
Alternatively, the judge may turn to a special master or court 
appointed expert with an appropriate background in the technology 
at issue. 
Dictionaries are another source of potential confusion and 
error.  When a claim term is not viewed as a term of art, the CAFC 
may rely on a non-technical dictionary for a definition.298  However, 
should the claim term be viewed as a term of art, a non-technical 
dictionary is the wrong choice.299  Sometimes the CAFC states that it 
will analyze the intrinsic evidence, while at the same time relying on a 
general-purpose dictionary.300  The study for this Comment found 
that the CAFC reversed thirteen out of the twenty cases relying on a 
dictionary definition (either by the trial court or the CAFC) on 
appeal.301 
 
 298 Winbond Electronics Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 4 Fed. App. 832, 840 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001) (“‘Adjacent’ is not a term of art and thus should receive its ordinary and 
accustomed meaning: close to; next to; adjoining.  WEBSTER’S II NEW RIVERSIDE 
UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 79 (1988).”). 
 299 AFG Industries, Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 239 F.3d 1239, 1247-48 (Fed. Cir. 
2001) (“This court has repeatedly cautioned against using non-scientific dictionaries 
for defining technical words. . . .  This case provides a good example of why 
definitions from general usage dictionaries may fail to provide satisfactory 
constructions of technical claim terms in dispute. . . .  A trial court, when construing 
a term of art, must define the term in a manner consistent with the scientific and 
technical context in which it is used in the patent.”).  Therefore, it is important first 
to determine if a claim element is a term of art. 
 300 Tapco Int’l Corp. v. Van Mark Products Corp., 18 Fed. App. 865, 868 (Fed. Cir. 
2001) (“In interpreting an asserted claim, the court first looks to the intrinsic 
evidence of record. . . .  Turning to the language of claim 3, we first look to the 
ordinary meaning of the disputed claim terms. . . .  ‘Project’ is defined as ‘causing to 
protrude.’”) (internal citation omitted). 
 301 Hemphill v. McNeil-PPC, Inc., 25 Fed. App. 915, 918 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim 
construction affirmed); see also Rexnord Corp. v. The Laitram Corp., 274 F.3d 1336, 
1344 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction reversed); Circle R, Inc. v. Trail King 
Industries, Inc., 21 Fed. Appx. 894, 898 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction 
reversed); DoorKing Inc. v. Sentex Sys. Inc., 19 Fed. App. 872, 876-77 (Fed. Cir. 
2001) (claim construction reversed); Fin Control Sys. Pty, Ltd. v. OAM, Inc., 265 F.3d 
1311, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction affirmed); Kopykake Enterprises, 
Inc. v. The Lucks Co., 264 F.3d 1377, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction 
affirmed); Ecolab Inc. v. Envirochem Inc., 264 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(claim construction reversed); Kustom Signals, Inc. v. Applied Concepts, Inc., 264 
F.3d 1326, 1330-31 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction affirmed); Bell Atlantic 
Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Communications Group, Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1267 
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction affirmed); Generation II Orthotics Inc. v. 
Medical Technology Inc., 263 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction 
reversed after two Markman Hearings); Tapco Int’l Corp. v. Van Mark Products 
Corp., 18 Fed. App. 865, 868 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction reversed); MSM 
Investments Co., LLC v. Carolwood Corp., 259 F.3d 1335, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
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Probably one of the trickiest areas relating to patents is the use 
of “means plus function” language in the claims.302  This language, 
often express as “a means for doing X,”303 “must be construed to cover 
the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the 
specification and equivalents thereof.”304  The MPEP provides an 
excellent reference for detailed analysis of means plus function claim 
limitations.305  As a preliminary matter, the judge must decide if 
section 112, sixth paragraph applies.306  After deciding that means 
plus function applies, the judge must “identify the function explicitly 
recited in the claim.”307  Next, the judge identifies “the corresponding 
structure set forth in the written description that performs the 
particular function set forth in the claim.”308  Then the judge 
determines equivalents to this structure.309  It should be evident that 
 
(claim construction reversed); Dow Chem. Co. v. Sumitomo Chem. Co., 257 F.3d 
1364, 1369, 1372-73 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction affirmed); Gart v. Logitech, 
Inc., 254 F.3d 1334, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction reversed); Scholle 
Corp. v. Packaging Sys., LLC, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 11772, *11-12 (Fed. Cir. June 6, 
2001 (claim construction reversed); Transonic Sys., Inc. v. Non-Invasive Med. Techs. 
Corp., 10 Fed. App. 928, 930-31 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction reversed); 
DeMarini Sports, Inc. v. Worth, Inc., 239 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim 
construction affirmed); AFG Industries, Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., Inc., 239 F.3d 1239, 
1247-48 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction reversed); Wenger Mfg., Inc. v. Coating 
Machinery Sys., Inc. 239 F.3d 1225, 1233 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction 
reversed); Winbond Electronics Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 4 Fed. App. 832, 840-
41 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction reversed).  In some cases, the trial court did 
not rely on a dictionary but the CAFC did.  See, e.g., Ecolab Inc. v. Envirochem Inc., 
264 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2001); AFG Industries, Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., Inc., 
239 F.3d 1239, 1247-48 (Fed. Cir. 2001).  In other cases, the trial court used a 
dictionary while the CAFC relied on intrinsic evidence only.  See, e.g., Fin Control Sys. 
Pty, Ltd. v. OAM, Inc., 265 F.3d 1311, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2001).  However, in some cases 
it was not clear what evidence either court examined, so detecting any useful 
patterns is not possible. 
 302 Means plus function claim elements are provided for by 35 U.S.C. Section 112, 
paragraph six (1994) (“An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as 
a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, 
material or acts in support thereof.”). 
 303 See MPEP § 2181 (stating that “the claim limitations must use the phrase 
‘means for’ or ‘step for’”). 
 304 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 6 (emphasis added). 
 305 See MPEP §§ 2181–2186. 
 306 Use of “means” creates a presumption that Section 112 (sixth paragraph) 
applies, but if too much structure provided in the claim element, Section 112 (sixth 
paragraph) will not apply.  Also, Section 112 (sixth paragraph) can apply even 
without use of “means” language. 
 307 Asyst Techs., Inc. v. Empak, Inc., 268 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 308 Id. 
 309 An equivalence examination under Section 112 (sixth paragraph) is more 
limited than an equivalence examination under the doctrine of equivalents.  See 
Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Industries, Inc., 145 F.3d 1303, 
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such language can be very powerful.  It allows the person drafting the 
application to avoid “claim[ing] in a patent every device required to 
enable the invention to be used.”310 
In 2001, fifteen cases included means plus function claims.311  
Out of the fifteen cases, the CAFC reversed seven (46.7%) on 
appeal.312  What is surprising is that the CAFC did not reverse a 
greater percentage of these cases.  The CAFC pointed out a few of 
the pitfalls in construing means plus function claim language.  The 
judge must determine the structure of the “means” element.313  Also, 
“a court may not import functional limitations that are not recited in 
the claim, or structural limitations from the written description that 
are unnecessary to perform the claimed function.”314  Another 
comment was that “[a]s an aid in determining whether sufficient 
structure is recited by a term used in a [means plus function] claim 
limitation, this court has inquired into whether the ‘term, as the 
name for the structure, has a reasonably well understood meaning in 
 
1310 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 310 Asyst Techs., 268 F.3d at 1371 (quoting Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 
640 F.2d 1193, 1197 (Ct. Cl. 1980). 
 311 Kudlacek v. DBC, Inc., 25 Fed. App. 837, 840 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim 
construction affirmed); J & M Corp. v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 269 F.3d 1360, 1364 
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction affirmed); Asyst Techs. v. Empak, Inc., 268 F.3d 
1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction reversed); McGinley v. Franklin 
Sports, Inc., 262 F.3d 1339, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction affirmed); 
Mollhagen v. Witte, 18 Fed. App. 846, 848 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction 
affirmed); Budde v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 250 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(claim construction reversed); Bernard Dalsin Mfg. Co. v. RMR Products, Inc., 10 
Fed. App. 882, 885 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction reversed); Lockheed Martin 
Corp. v. Space Systems/Loral, Inc., 249 F.3d 1314, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2001), vacated and 
remanded, 122 S. Ct. 2349 (2002) (claim construction reversed); Telemac Cellular 
Corp. v. Topp Telecom, Inc., 247 F.3d 1316, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim 
construction affirmed); Somfy, S.A. v. Springs Window Fashions Div., Inc., 6 Fed. 
App. 895, 896 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction affirmed); Medtronic, Inc. v. 
Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 248 F.3d 1303, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim 
construction affirmed); Optimal Recreation Solutions LLP v. Leading Edge Techs., 
Inc., 6 Fed. App. 873, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction reversed); Wenger 
Mfg., Inc. v. Coating Mach. Sys., Inc., 239 F.3d 1225, 1230 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim 
construction reversed); Winbond Electronics Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 4 Fed. 
App. 832, 841 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction reversed); Globetrotter Software, 
Inc. v. Elan Computer Group, Inc., 236 F.3d 1363, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim 
construction affirmed). 
 312 See supra note 311. 
 313 Winbond Electronics, 4 Fed. App. at 842 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“The Commission 
did not determine any structure for the ‘access means’ in its opinion.”). 
 314 Wenger Mfg., Inc., 239 F.3d at 1233; see also Lockheed Martin, 249 F.3d at 1324 
(“In this case, the District Court erred by improperly broadening the scope of the 
claimed function by ‘reading out’ the limitations contained in the claim language.”). 
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the art.’”315 
A combination of solutions can substantially reduce these and 
other errors in trial court claim construction.  Foremost, as the court 
with the best understanding of how to perform claim construction, 
the CAFC should provide clear guidance on claim construction 
issues.  For example, the CAFC should clearly explain how to use 
dictionaries.316  Because reversal rates are so abysmal for cases in 
which the trial court conducted a Markman Hearing,317 the CAFC 
should attempt to provide some guidelines or standards for these 
hearings.  Furthermore, the CAFC should identify references that it 
uses and expressly recommend that trial courts use them as well.318  
Also, the CAFC should more clearly explain how to properly apply 
the canons of claim construction. 
Whether or not the CAFC takes any of these steps, trial judges 
should also make changes on their own.  In most cases, trial judges 
do not hear enough patent cases to become proficient in interpreting 
claims.  Therefore, each district court should designate a judge to 
handle patent cases, or at least use an experienced special master or 
magistrate judge to perform claim construction.319  However, the onus 
should not be placed solely on trial judges and the CAFC.  Patent 
attorneys and patent agents who draft applications can sidestep many 
problems by clearly defining terms, including claim elements, in the 
specification.  Without the concerted efforts of the CAFC, trial judges 
and practitioners, the CAFC will continue to reverse claim 
constructions at an unacceptable level, costing litigants millions of 




 315 Optimal Recreation Solutions, 6 Fed. App. at 877 (quoting Greenberg v. Ethicon 
Endo-Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 1580, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). 
 316 By way of example, in Vitronics, the court stated that extrinsic evidence will 
rarely be needed.  Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronics, Inc., 90 F.3d 1579, 1585; see also 
supra note 109.  However, the same court stated that dictionaries, a form of extrinsic 
evidence, should be consulted at nearly any time.  Id. at 1584 n.6; see also supra text 
accompanying note 118.  Another issue arises in the choice between technical and 
non-technical dictionaries.  See supra note 298-99 and accompanying text. 
 317 See supra note 257. 
 318 See supra Part II.B.2. 
 319 See Paul D. Rheingold, Prospects for Managing Mass Tort Litigation in the State 
Courts, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 910, 912 n.10 (noting that Judge Marina Corodemus 
handles all mass tort litigation in the New Jersey state trial courts). 
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CONCLUSION 
Markman I and its progeny have spawned a whole new era of 
patent litigation.  Trial judges are required to perform claim 
construction as a matter of law.  While the trial judges have a lot of 
leeway in how they conduct Markman Hearings, the CAFC is still 
reversing claim constructions at an alarming rate.  Seven years after 
Markman I, one can now draw the “empirically sound conclusion” 
that the “training and discipline” of trial judges does not result in 
reliable claim construction.  The reversal rate is still around 40%.  
Procedural rules, such as the Patent Local Rules from the Northern 
District of California, may provide structure to patent litigation, but 
cannot directly improve the quality of claim construction.  However, 
several actions can reduce the reversal rate.  In addition to special 
masters, magistrate judges and court appointed experts, trial judges 
can rely on widely used references to improve claim construction 
skills.  Resources that may prove most helpful are tools that have been 
long used by patent practitioners.  For example, the MPEP is a vital 
resource and, when combined with a claim drafting text, should 
provide sufficient support for a trial judge so that the CAFC will 
uphold more claim constructions.  Furthermore, the CAFC must take 
a more proactive role in providing clear guidance to the trial judges.  
Otherwise, the uncertainty generated by Markman I will continue. 
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APPENDIX A: 
 TABLE OF APPELLATE LEVEL CLAIM CONSTRUCTION CASES IN 2001 








LNP Engineering Plastics, 
Inc. v. Miller Waste Mills, 
Inc. 
275 F.3d 1347 ?? No  
2 Kudacek v. DBC, Inc. 25 Fed. App. 837 ?? No No 
3 
Intermatic Inc. v. Lamson 
& Sessions Co. 
273 F.3d 1355 Yes No  
4 
Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. 
Ethicon, Inc. 
276 F.3d 1304 Yes No Yes 
5 
Hemphill v. McNeil-PPC, 
Inc. 
25 Fed. App. 915 No No No 
6 
Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram 
Corp. 
274 F.3d 1336 ?? Yes Yes 
7 
J&M Corp. v. Harley-
Davidson, Inc. 
269 F.3d 1360 ?? No No 
8 
Superior Fireplace Co. v. 
Majestic Products Co. 
270 F.3d 1358 Yes No No 
9 
Bradford Co. v. Jefferson 
Smurfit Co. 
2001 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 25205 
?? No  
10 
Asyst Technologies, Inc. v. 
Empak, Inc. 
268 F.3d 1364 ?? Yes Yes 
11 
Xerox Corp. v. 3COM 
Corp. 
267 F.3d 1361 ?? No Yes 
12 
Circle R, Inc. v. Trail King 
Industries, Inc. 
21 Fed. App. 894 ?? Yes No 
13 
Exxon Research & 
Engineering Co. v. U.S. 
265 F.3d 1371 No Yes Yes 
14 
Hilgraeve Corp. v. 
Symantec Corp. 
265 F.3d 1336 No No Yes 
15 
DoorKing, Inc. v. Sentex 
Sys., Inc. 
19 Fed. App. 872 





Fin Control Sys. Pty, Ltd 
v. OAM, Inc. 
265 F.3d 1311 Yes No Yes 
17 
Advanced Cardiovascular 
Sys. v. Medtronic, Inc. 
265 F.3d 1294  No No 
18 
Kopykake Enterprises, 
Inc. v. Lucks Co. 
264 F.3d 1377 ?? No  
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19 
Ecolab, Inc. v. 
Envirochem, Inc. 
264 F.3d 1358 No Yes Yes 
20 
Sandt Technology, Ltd. v. 
Resco Metal and Plastics 
Corp. 
264 F.3d 1344 ?? No Yes 
21 
Kustom Signals, Inc. v. 
Applied Concepts, Inc. 
264 F.3d 1326 Yes No No 
22 
TurboCare Div. of Demag 
Delaval Turbomachinery 
Copr. v.General Electric 
Co. 
264 F.3d 1111 ?? Yes Yes 
23 
CIVIX-DDI, LLC v. 
Microsoft Corp. 
18 Fed. App. 892 Yes No No 
24 
McGinley v. Franklin 
Sports, Inc. 
262 F.3d 1339 Yes No  
25 
Glaxo Group Ltd. V. 
Ranbaxy Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc. 
262 F.3d 1333 ?? Yes  
26 
Bell Atlantic Network 
Services, Inc. v. Covad 
Communications Group, 
Inc. 
262 F.3d 1258 ?? No No 
27 
Generation II Orthotics 
Inc. v. Medical Tech Inc. 







KX Indus., L.P. v. Pur 
Water Purification Prods. 
18 Fed. App. 871 Yes No No 
29 
Tapco Int’l Corp. v. Van 
Mark Prods. Corp. 
18 Fed. App. 865 Yes:Hearing Yes Yes 
30 
MSM Investments Co., 
LLC v. Carolwood Corp. 








Day Int’l, Inc. v. Reeves 
Bros., Inc. 
260 F.3d 1343 ?? No No 
32 
Masimo Corp. v. 
Mallinckrodt, Inc. 
18 Fed. App. 852 ?? No No 
33 
Pall Corp. v. PTI 
Technologies, Inc. 
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34 
Advanced Cardiovascular 
Systems, Inc. v. Scimed 
Life Systems, Inc. 
261 F.3d 1329 Yes Yes Yes 
35 
Innovad, Inc. v. Microsoft 
Corp. 









36 S3 Inc. v. NVIDIA Corp. 259 F.3d 1364 ?? Yes Yes 
37 
Viskase Corp. v. American 
Nat’l Can Co. 
261 F.3d 1316 Yes Yes Yes 
38 Mollhagen v. Whitte 18 Fed. App. 846  No No 
39 
Pannu v. Storz 
Instruments, Inc. 
258 F.3d 1366  No No 
40 
Dow Chemical Co. v. 
Sumitomo Chem. Co., 
Ltd. 
257 F.3d 1364 ?? Yes Yes 
41 In re Roemer 258 F.3d 1303  Yes  
42 
Dayco Products, Inc. v. 
Total Containment, Inc. 
258 F.3d 1317 Yes Yes Yes 
43 
Avery Dennison Corp. v. 
Flexcon Co., Inc. 
15 Fed. App. 882  No No 
44 
Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo 
Electronic America, Inc. 
257 F.3d 1331 Yes Yes  
45 
Interactive Gift Express, 
Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc. 
256 F.3d 1323 No Yes  
46 
Applied Concepts, Inc. v. 
Olympia Indus., Inc. 
15 Fed. App. 793 ?? Yes  
47 
Datastrip (IOM) Ltd. V. 
Symbol Techs., Inc. 
15 Fed. App. 843 Yes No  
48 
Newell Window 
Furnishings, Inc. v. 
Springs Window Fashions 
Div., Inc. 
15 Fed. App. 836  No  
49 Rapoport v. Dement 254 F.3d 1053  No  
50 
Durel Corp. v. Osram 
Sylvania Inc. 
256 F.3d 1298  Yes  
51 Gart v. Logitech, Inc. 254 F.3d 1334  Yes Yes 
52 
K&K Jump 
Start/Chargers, Inc. v. 
13 Fed. App. 982 Yes Yes  




Unique Coupons, Inc. v. 
Northfield Corp. 
12 Fed. App. 928  Yes  
54 
Semitool, Inc. v. Novellus 
Sys., Inc. 
12 Fed. App. 918 Yes Yes No 
55 
Acromed Corp. v. 
Sofamor Danek Group 
253 F.3d 1371  No  
56 
Scholle Corp. v. 
Packaging Systems, LLC 
2001 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 11772 
Yes Yes Yes 
57 
Transonic Sys. Inc. v. 
Non-Invasive Med. Techs. 
Corp. 








GmbH & Co. KG v. 
Biocorp., Inc. 
249 F.3d 1341  No  
60 
Bernard Dalsin Mfg. Co. 
v. RMR Products, Inc. 
10 Fed. App. 882  Yes Yes 
61 Oak Tech., Inc. v. ITC 248 F.3d 1316  No  
62 
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. 
Space Systems/Loral, Inc. 
249 F.3d 1314 Yes Yes No 
63 
Telemac Cellular Corp. v. 
Topp Telecom, Inc. 
247 F.3d 1316  No No 
64 
Somfy, S.A. v. Springs 
Window Fashions Div., 
Inc. 
6 Fed. App. 895 Yes No Yes 
65 
Medtronic, Inc. v. 
Advanced Cardiovascular 
Sys., Inc. 
248 F.3d 1303 Yes No  
66 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. 
v. Ben Venue Labs., Inc. 
246 F.3d 1368 Yes No Yes 
67 
Schoell v. Regal Marine 
Industries, Inc. 
247 F.3d 1202  No No 
68 
Mentor H/S, Inc. v. 
Medical Device Alliance, 
Inc. 
244 F.3d 1365  No  
69 
Optimal Recreation 
Solutions LLP v. Leading 
Edge Techs., Inc. 
6 Fed. App. 873  Yes  
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70 
Medical Device 
Technologies. v. C.R. 
Bard, Inc. 
7 Fed. App. 945 Yes No Yes 
71 
Pandrol USA, LP v. 
Airboss Railway Products, 
Inc. 
10 Fed. App. 837 Yes Yes Yes 
72 
Research Corp. Techs. v. 
Gensia Labs., Inc. 
10 Fed. App. 856 Yes No  
73 
Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. 
Cleveland Golf Co. 
242 F.3d 1376  No Yes 
74 
Netword, LLC v. Centraal 
Corp. 
242 F.3d 1347  No No 
75 
SciMed Life Sys. v. 
Advanced Cardiovascular 
Sys. 
242 F.3d 1337 Yes No No 
76 
Polymer Indus. Prods. Co. 
v. Bridgestone/Firestone, 
Inc. 
10 Fed. App. 812  No  
77 
Mycogen Plant Science v. 
Monsanto Co. 
243 F.3d 1316 Yes No  
78 
Senior Techs., Inc. v. R.F. 
Techs., Inc. 
2001 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 4179 
 Yes  
79 
Herman v. William 
Brooks Shoe Co. 
7 Fed. App. 941 Yes No No 
80 Maltezos v. AT&T Corp. 6 Fed. App. 850  No No 
81 
Crystal Semiconductor 
Corp. v. Tritech 
Microelectronics Int’l., 
Inc. 
246 F.3d 1336 Yes No No 
82 
Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. 
Tyco Int’l, Inc. 
4 Fed. App. 946  No  
83 
Amazon.com, Inc. v. 
Barnesandnoble.com, 
Inc. 






Forest Labs., Inc. v. 
Abbott Labs. 
239 F.3d 1305 Yes Yes  
85 
Biovail Corp. Int’l v. 
Andrx Pharms., Inc. 
239 F.3d 1297  No  
86 
DeMarini Sports, Inc. v. 
Worth, Inc. 
239 F.3d 1314 Yes No  
87 
Amphenol Corp. v. 
Maxconn Inc. 
4 Fed. App. 928 Yes No  
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88 
Collett v. Piper’s Saw 
Shop, Inc. 
4 Fed. App. 904 Yes No  
89 
AFG Indus., Inc. v. 
Cardinal IG Co., Inc. 
239 F.3d 1239 Yes Yes Yes 
90 
Wenger Mfg., Inc. v. 
Coating Mach. Sys., Inc. 
239 F.3d 1225  Yes Yes 
91 
Purdue Pharma L.P. v. 
Boehringer Ingelheim 
GMBH 
237 F.3d 1359  No  
92 
Winbond Electronics 
Corp. v. ITC 
4 Fed. App. 832  Yes  
93 
Globetrotter Software, 
Inc. v. Elan Computer 
Group, Inc. 
236 F.3d 1361 Yes No  
94 
Union Pacific Resources 
Co. v. Chesapeake Energy 
Corp. 
236 F.3d 684 Yes No  
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APPENDIX B: 
KEY POINTS TO NOTE FROM THE CAFC OPINIONS 
 Case Name 
Key Points to Note from the CAFC 
Decision 
1 
LNP Engineering Plastics, Inc. v. 
Miller Waste Mills, Inc. 
 
2 Kudacek v. DBC, Inc. Discussion of claim differentiation 
3 




Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Ethicon, 
Inc. 
Excluding a reasonable practice of a 
method is rarely correct; discussion of 
the transitional term “comprising”; 
The CAFC referred to the Kayton text. 
5 Hemphill v. McNeil-PPC, Inc.  
6 Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp. 
A discussion of the cannons of claim 
construction and the ordinary 
meaning of terms; The CAFC used the 
MPEP. 
7 
J&M Corp. v. Harley-Davidson, 
Inc. 
A discussion of means plus function 
claims with regard to  structure and 
the Doctrine of Equivalents 
8 
Superior Fireplace Co. v. 
Majestic Products Co. 
Noting that a patent is presumed valid 
9 
Bradford Co. v. Jefferson Smurfit 
Co. 
Explains the term “comprising” to 
mean “at least.” 
10 
Asyst Technologies, Inc. v. 
Empak, Inc. 
Deals with means plus function 
11 Xerox Corp. v. 3COM Corp. 
The trial court improperly applied its 
own claim construction. 
12 
Circle R, Inc. v. Trail King 
Industries, Inc. 
The trial judge (not the magistrate) 
should have used the ordinary 
meaning of the term. 
13 
Exxon Research & Engineering 
Co. v. U.S. 
The trial court improperly imported a 
condition from the specification into a 
claim. 
14 








Fin Control Sys. Pty, Ltd v. OAM, 
Inc. 
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17 




Kopykake Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Lucks Co. 
Dictionary definitions “may always be 
relied on by the court.”  264 F.3d 1377, 
1382 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
19 Ecolab, Inc. v. Envirochem, Inc.  
20 
Sandt Technology, Ltd. v. Resco 
Metal and Plastics Corp. 
“All claims are presumed valid 
independently . . . .”  264 F.3d 1344, 
1356 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
21 




TurboCare Div. of Demag 
Delaval Turbomachinery Copr. 
v.General Electric Co. 
Trial court misread a preferred 
embodiment into a claim. 
23 
CIVIX-DDI, LLC v. Microsoft 
Corp. 
 
24 McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc. 
Discussion of a means & function 
interpretation 
25 
Glaxo Group Ltd. V. Ranbaxy 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
An error in the trial court claim 
construction was an abuse of discretion 
in granting a preliminary injunction. 
26 
Bell Atlantic Network Services, 




Generation II Orthotics Inc. v. 
Medical Technology Inc. 
Trial court improperly imported a 
limitation into a claim; several claims 
were improperly construed together. 
28 




















Pall Corp. v. PTI Technologies, 
Inc. 
Trial court’s error was in reading the 
plain language of the claims. 
34 
Advanced Cardiovascular 
Systems, Inc. v. Scimed Life 
Systems, Inc. 
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35 Innovad, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. 
Trial court improperly imported 
limitations from the specification into 
claims. 
36 S3 Inc. v. NVIDIA Corp. 
The trial court ignored testimony 
showing information commonly known 
in the field. 
37 
Viskase Corp. v. American Nat’l 
Can Co. 
 
38 Mollhagen v. Whitte  
39 Pannu v. Storz Instruments, Inc.  
40 
Dow Chemical Co. v. Sumitomo 
Chem. Co., Ltd. 
The trial court performed two claim 
constructions, but was still reversed. 
41 In re Roemer  
42 
Dayco Products, Inc. v. Total 
Containment, Inc. 
The trial court improperly imported 
limits into claims. 
43 




Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo Electronic 
America, Inc. 
The preamble is not necessarily 
limiting 
45 




Applied Concepts, Inc. v. 
Olympia Indus., Inc. 
The trial court failed to properly find 
structure in the specification for a 
means plus function claim 
47 




Newell Window Furnishings, Inc. 
v. Springs Window Fashions Div., 
Inc. 
 
49 Rapoport v. Dement  
50 
Durel Corp. v. Osram Sylvania 
Inc. 
The trial court failed to give meaning 
to an established term and the 
specification’s use of the term. 
51 Gart v. Logitech, Inc. 
The trial court improperly imported a 
limitation from the specification into a 
claim. 
52 
K&K Jump Start/Chargers, Inc. 
v. Schumacher Electric Corp. 
 
53 
Unique Coupons, Inc. v. 
Northfield Corp. 
Clear guidance in the specification is 
not improper importation of a claim 
limit. 
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54 








Scholle Corp. v. Packaging 
Systems, LLC 
The trial court misconstrued the type 
of seal used. 
57 
Transonic Sys. Inc. v. Non-
Invasive Med. Techs. Corp. 
The trial court improperly used 
intrinsic evidence to narrow the scope 
of the claims. 
58 Budde v. Harely-Davidson, Inc. 
The CAFC provided a discussion of the 
level of the skill in the art. 
59 
Biotech Biologishce 
Naturverpackungen GmbH & 
Co. KG v. Biocorp., Inc. 
 
60 
Bernard Dalsin Mfg. Co. v. RMR 
Products, Inc. 
 
61 Oak Tech., Inc. v. ITC  
62 
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Space 
Systems/Loral, Inc. 
The trial court improperly broadened 
the scope of the claims. 
63 




Somfy, S.A. v. Springs Window 
Fashions Div., Inc. 
 
65 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Advanced 
Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. 
 
66 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben 
Venue Labs., Inc. 
Discussion of the preamble 
67 




Mentor H/S, Inc. v. Medical 
Device Alliance, Inc. 
 
69 
Optimal Recreation Solutions 
LLP v. Leading Edge Techs., Inc. 
A discussion of means plus function 
and structure. 
70 
Medical Device Technologies. v. 
C.R. Bard, Inc. 
A discussion of means plus function 
claims. 
71 
Pandrol USA, LP v. Airboss 
Railway Products, Inc. 
The trial court claim construction was 
in direct conflict with the plain 
language of another claim; the trial 
court claim construction would reject a 
preferred embodiment. 
72 Research Corp. Techs. v. Gensia Improper use of extrinsic evidence by 
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Labs., Inc. trial court 
73 
Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland 
Golf Co. 
Discussion of a canon of claim 
construction: construe claim elements 
so as to preserve validity. 
74 Netword, LLC v. Centraal Corp.  
75 
SciMed Life Sys. v. Advanced 
Cardiovascular Sys. 
The trial court properly read claims in 
view of the specification without 
reading in a limitation. 
76 








Senior Techs., Inc. v. R.F. Techs., 
Inc. 
The trial court was not clear in its 
claim construction analysis. 
79 
Herman v. William Brooks Shoe 
Co. 
 
80 Maltezos v. AT&T Corp.  
81 
Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. 
Tritech Microelectronics Int’l., 
Inc. 
Discussion of ‘a’, ‘an’, ‘comprising’, 
and ‘having’ 
82 




Amazon.com, Inc. v. 
Barnesandnoble.com, Inc. 
 
84 Forest Labs., Inc. v. Abbott Labs. 
Extrinsic evidence is no good when 
used to vary or contradict the language 
of the claim. 
85 




DeMarini Sports, Inc. v. Worth, 
Inc. 
Should look at all intrinsic evidence to 
do claim construction. 
87 
Amphenol Corp. v. Maxconn 
Inc. 
 
88 Collett v. Piper’s Saw Shop, Inc. A discussion of the all elements rule 
89 
AFG Indus., Inc. v. Cardinal IG 
Co., Inc. 
A discussion of transitional phrases: 
closed/open, ‘composed of’; the CAFC 
cautioned against the use of non-
technical dictionaries 
90 
Wenger Mfg., Inc. v. Coating 
Mach. Sys., Inc. 
The trial court improperly restricted a 
means element. 
91 
Purdue Pharma L.P. v. 
Boehringer Ingelheim GMBH 
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92 
Winbond Electronics Corp. v. 
ITC 
The CAFC cited Landis; the trial court 
failed to determine the structure for a 
means plus function claim 
93 
Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. 
Elan Computer Group, Inc. 
 
94 
Union Pacific Resources Co. v. 
Chesapeake Energy Corp. 
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APPENDIX C: 
INFORMATION CONCERNING THE DISTRICT COURTS 
 Case Name Lower Ct Trial Ct. Judge 
1 
LNP Engineering Plastics, Inc. v. 
Miller Waste Mills, Inc. 
D. Del. McKelvie 
2 Kudacek v. DBC, Inc. N.D. Iowa Bennett 
3 
Intermatic Inc. v. Lamson & 
Sessions Co. 
N.D. Ill. Reinhard 
4 





5 Hemphill v. McNeil-PPC, Inc. D. Md. Chasanow 
6 Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp. W.D. Wisc. Crabb 
7 
J&M Corp. v. Harley-Davidson, 
Inc. 
D. Az. Broomfield 
8 
Superior Fireplace Co. v. 
Majestic Products Co. 
C.D. Cal. Baird 
9 
Bradford Co. v. Jefferson Smurfit 
Co. 
W.D. Mich.  
10 
Asyst Technologies, Inc. v. 
Empak, Inc. 
N.D. Cal.  
11 Xerox Corp. v. 3COM Corp. W.D.N.Y. Telesca 
12 
Circle R, Inc. v. Trail King 
Industries, Inc. 
D. Neb. Magistrate & Trial Judge 
13 
Exxon Research & Engineering 
Co. v. U.S. 
Ct. Fed. Cl. Damich 
14 
Hilgraeve Corp. v. Symantec 
Corp. 
E.D. Mich. Gadola 
15 
DoorKing, Inc. v. Sentex Sys., 
Inc. 
C.D. Cal. Paez 
16 
Fin Control Sys. Pty, Ltd v. OAM, 
Inc. 
C.D. Cal. Snyder 
17 
Advanced Cardiovascular Sys. v. 
Medtronic, Inc. 
N.D. Cal. Jensen 
18 
Kopykake Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Lucks Co. 
C.D. Cal.  
19 Ecolab, Inc. v. Envirochem, Inc. D.N.J. Greenaway, Jr. 
20 
Sandt Technology, Ltd. v. Resco 
Metal and Plastics Corp. 
S.D.N.Y. Magistrate 
21 
Kustom Signals, Inc. v. Applied 
Concepts, Inc. 
D. Kan. Vratil 
 768 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 33:711 
22 
TurboCare Div. of Demag 
Delaval Turbomachinery Copr. 
v.General Electric Co. 
D. Mass. Ponsor / Neiman? 
23 
CIVIX-DDI, LLC v. Microsoft 
Corp. 
D. Colo. Babcock 
24 McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc. D. Kan. Lungstrum 
25 




Bell Atlantic Network Services, 
Inc. v. Covad Communications 
Group, Inc. 
E.D. Va. Friedman 
27 
Generation II Orthotics Inc. v. 
Medical Technology Inc. 
W.D. Wash. Coughnour 
28 
KX Indus., L.P. v. Pur Water 
Purification Prods. 
D. Del. McKelvie 
29 
Tapco Int’l Corp. v. Van Mark 
Prods. Corp. 
E.D. Mich. Zatkoff 
30 
MSM Investments Co., LLC v. 
Carolwood Corp. 
N.D. Cal. Infante 
31 




Masimo Corp. v. Mallinckrodt, 
Inc. 
C.D. Cal.  
33 





Systems, Inc. v. Scimed Life 
Systems, Inc. 
S.D. Ind. Hamilton 
35 Innovad, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. N.D. Tex. McBryde 
36 S3 Inc. v. NVIDIA Corp. N.D. Cal. Armstrong 
37 
Viskase Corp. v. American Nat’l 
Can Co. 
N.D. Ill. Bucklo 
38 Mollhagen v. Whitte D. Neb.  
39 Pannu v. Storz Instruments, Inc. S.D. Fl. Dimitrouleas 
40 
Dow Chemical Co. v. Sumitomo 
Chem. Co., Ltd. 
E.D. Mich. Roberts 
41 In re Roemer BPAI  
42 
Dayco Products, Inc. v. Total 
Containment, Inc. 
W.D. Mo. Wright 
43 
Avery Dennison Corp. v. Flexcon 
Co., Inc. 
N.D. Ill. Anderson 
44 Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo Electronic E.D. Va. Spencer 
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America, Inc. 
45 




Applied Concepts, Inc. v. 
Olympia Indus., Inc. 
W.D. Pa.  
47 
Datastrip (IOM) Ltd. V. Symbol 
Techs., Inc. 
D. Del.  
48 
Newell Window Furnishings, Inc. 
v. Springs Window Fashions Div., 
Inc. 
N.D. Ill. Magistrate 
49 Rapoport v. Dement BPAI  
50 
Durel Corp. v. Osram Sylvania 
Inc. 
D. Az. Van Sickle 
51 Gart v. Logitech, Inc. C.D. Cal. Marshall 
52 
K&K Jump Start/Chargers, Inc. 
v. Schumacher Electric Corp. 
W.D. Mo. Sachs 
53 
Unique Coupons, Inc. v. 
Northfield Corp. 
N.D. Ill. Leinenweber 
54 
Semitool, Inc. v. Novellus Sys., 
Inc. 
N.D. Cal.  
55 
Acromed Corp. v. Sofamor 
Danek Group 
N.D. Oh.  
56 
Scholle Corp. v. Packaging 
Systems, LLC 
C.D. Cal.  
57 
Transonic Sys. Inc. v. Non-
Invasive Med. Techs. Corp. 
D. Utah Benson 
58 Budde v. Harely-Davidson, Inc. N.D. Cal. Fogel 
59 
Biotech Biologishce 
Naturverpackungen GmbH & 
Co. KG v. Biocorp., Inc. 
C.D. Cal. Rafeedie 
60 
Bernard Dalsin Mfg. Co. v. RMR 
Products, Inc. 
D. Minn. Tunheim 
61 Oak Tech., Inc. v. ITC ITC  
62 
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Space 
Systems/Loral, Inc. 
N.D. Cal. Illston 
63 
Telemac Cellular Corp. v. Topp 
Telecom, Inc. 
N.D. Cal. Wilken 
64 
Somfy, S.A. v. Springs Window 
Fashions Div., Inc. 
N.D. Ill. Castillo 
65 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Advanced 
Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. 
D. Minn. Rosenbaum 
66 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben D.N.J. Walls 
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Venue Labs., Inc. 
67 
Schoell v. Regal Marine 
Industries, Inc. 
M.D. Fl. Baker, Magistrate 
68 
Mentor H/S, Inc. v. Medical 
Device Alliance, Inc. 
C.D. Cal. Keller 
69 
Optimal Recreation Solutions 
LLP v. Leading Edge Techs., Inc. 
D. Az.  
70 
Medical Device Technologies. v. 
C.R. Bard, Inc. 
N.D. Ill. Grady 
71 
Pandrol USA, LP v. Airboss 
Railway Products, Inc. 
W.D. Mo. Wright, Scott 
72 
Research Corp. Techs. v. Gensia 
Labs., Inc. 
D.N.J. Brown, Garrett 
73 
Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland 
Golf Co. 
D. Az. Van Sickle 
74 Netword, LLC v. Centraal Corp. E.D. Va. Brinkema 
75 
SciMed Life Sys. v. Advanced 
Cardiovascular Sys. 
N.D. Cal. Jenkins 
76 
Polymer Indus. Prods. Co. v. 
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. 
N.D. Oh.  
77 
Mycogen Plant Science v. 
Monsanto Co. 
D. Del. McKelvie 
78 
Senior Techs., Inc. v. R.F. Techs., 
Inc. 
D. Neb. Kopf 
79 
Herman v. William Brooks Shoe 
Co. 
S.D.N.Y. Leisure 
80 Maltezos v. AT&T Corp. S.D.N.Y. McKenna 
81 
Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. 
Tritech Microelectronics Int’l., 
Inc. 
W.D. Tex. Sparks 
82 
Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Tyco 
Int’l, Inc. 
W.D. Wisc.  
83 
Amazon.com, Inc. v. 
Barnesandnoble.com, Inc. 
W.D. Wash. Pechman 
84 Forest Labs., Inc. v. Abbott Labs. W.D.N.Y. Arcara 
85 
Biovail Corp. Int’l v. Andrx 
Pharms., Inc. 
S.D. Fl. Dimitrouleas 
86 
DeMarini Sports, Inc. v. Worth, 
Inc. 
D. Or. King 
87 
Amphenol Corp. v. Maxconn 
Inc. 
N.D. Cal. Williams 
88 Collett v. Piper’s Saw Shop, Inc. E.D. Tex. Brown 
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89 
AFG Indus., Inc. v. Cardinal IG 
Co., Inc. 
E.D. Tenn. Hull 
90 
Wenger Mfg., Inc. v. Coating 
Mach. Sys., Inc. 
S.D. Iowa Pratt 
91 
Purdue Pharma L.P. v. 
Boehringer Ingelheim GMBH 
S.D.N.Y. Stein 
92 
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Elan Computer Group, Inc. 
N.D. Cal.  
94 
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